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COMMENT
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE: PROTECTING
FUNDAMENTAL PARENTAL RIGHTS WHILE
RECOGNIZING CHANGES IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY
Susan Tomaine+
On January 12, 2000, the Supreme Court of the United States
heard oral arguments in a case arising from a family quarrel
over grandparents seeking access to their two young
grandchildren.' Although it is an anomaly for the highest court
in the land to hear a domestic relations dispute,2 the Supreme
Court's ruling in Troxel v. Granville had potential national
implications.3  The dispute in Troxel centered on the
constitutionality of a Washington statute, which allowed Jenifer
and Gary Troxel to petition the state court for visitation rights
concerning their two grandchildren and permitted the court to
grant these rights despite the objections of the children's
mother.4 All fifty states have enacted "grandparent visitation"
statutes, which afford grandparents a judicial remedy when they
are denied access to their grandchildren. Consequently, this
family dispute justifiably received national attention.6
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
2. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Deny Grandparents Visiting Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2000, at A26 (reporting the Court's hesitancy to rule on
questions of state law involving parental rights).
3. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Cdriae American Civil Liberties Union and the
ACLU of Washington in Support of Respondent at 1, Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-138) [hereinafter Respondent's Briefl].
4. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61.
5. Id. at 73-74, n.* (citing every state's grandparent visitation statute). The
Washington statute at issue in Troxel applies not only to grandparents, but also
to other third parties. See infra note 157 (discussing the implications of a
ruling on Washington's third party visitation statute on other states'
grandparent visitation statutes).
6. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, A Victory for the Family, WALL ST. J., June
6, 2000, at A26; Greenhouse, supra note 2; Edward Walsh, Court Limits
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For the past forty years, state legislatures have created
grandparent visitation statutes to allow grandparents to seek
judicial intervention when they are denied access to their
grandchildren. Congress and the President have supported
such legislation.8 In addition, this issue has captured the
nation's attention;9 in part because powerful lobbying groups
represent grandparents' interests and most people willingly
presume that time spent with a grandparent is important for a
child. o
Recently, several states broadened the circumstances under
which grandparents can petition the courts for visitation." The
expansion of "grandparents rights" has raised concern over
when the state government, acting through a trial judge, may
influence the resolution of an internal family dispute. 12 Several
Visitation Rights of Grandparents, WASH. POST, June 6, 2000, at Al.
7. See e.g., infra note 85 and accompanying text (listing third party
visitation statutes); see generally John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale
for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351 (1998)
(discussing the issues that "arise when nonparents seek visitation with other
peoples' children").
8. See H.R. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong. (1983); Proclamation No. 6766, 60
Fed. Reg. 4067 (Jan. 19, 1995).
9. See Majorie Williams, Grandparents in Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
2000, at A27 (discussing the facts in Troxel and commenting on the difficulty of
involving the courts in family disputes); Cliff Collins, Family Ties: Family Law
Practitioners Await Clarification of Nonparental Rights, OR. ST. BAR BULL., May
2000, at 7, 9 (explaining the interest of family law practitioners in a clarification
of nonparental rights); see also supra note 6.
10. Edward M. Bums, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is it Time for the
Pendulum to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q., 59, 62 (1991).
11. Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of Grandparent Visitation Rights
Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of Grandparent Visitation Laws
in the Fifty States, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 319-20 (1994) (discussing
how the expansion of grandparent visitation statutes has caused decreased
reliance on judicial discretion and a broadened application of the statutes).
12. See, e.g., Joan C. Bohl, Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation:
How Precedent Fell Prey to Sentiment in Herdon v. Tuhey, 62 Mo. L. REv. 755-
58 (1997) (criticizing the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to declare the
state's grandparent visitation statute constitutional); Joan C. Bohl, The
"Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysis of Selected Grandparent
Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REv. 29, 80 (1996) [hereinafter Unprecedented
Intrusion] (concluding that states are not authorized to order forced grandparent
visitation); Bostock, supra note 11 (discussing the expansion of grandparent
visitation rights and suggesting that visitation be granted only when the
grandparents can show they had a sufficient relationship); Bums, supra note
10 (tracing the development of grandparent visitation statutes and suggesting
that possible constitutional violations stem from granting grandparent visitation
over the objections of the married parents); Cynthia L. Greene, Grandparents'
Visitation Rights: Is the Tide Turning?, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW., 51, 51
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state supreme courts, namely Tennessee, 13 Georgia, 14 North
Dakota,'5 and Washington 6 have invalidated their grandparent
visitation statutes, claiming that the provisions violate parents'
constitutional rights of privacy and autonomy.'
7
Tommie Granville, the respondent in Troxel, argued the same
when her children's paternal grandparents, Jenifer and Gary
Troxel, petitioned the Washington Superior Court for a visitation
order which would grant them more visitation rights with their
two granddaughters.' The court granted the Troxels' petition
and issued the order. 9 The Washington Supreme Court and the
Washington Court of Appeals, however, determined that the
order violated Granville's right to raise her children without state
20interference.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Washington
Supreme Court's ruling, holding that the trial court applied the
visitation statute in a manner that violated Granville's
constitutional rights.21 Because the Court issued a fragmented
opinion that failed to articulate the precise scope of the right to
parental autonomy and neglected to specify when a state may
intervene in a visitation dispute, the ruling will have a minimal
impact on current state legislation.22
(1994) (criticizing the rapid development of grandparent visitation statutes that
allow ordered visitation absent a finding of potential harm to the child).
13. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tenn. 1993).
14. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 770 (Ga. 1995).
15. Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 286 (N.D. 1999).
16. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
17. See infra Part I.D. (summarizing the holdings of state court cases that
have addressed the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes).
18. Respondent's Brief at 15, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No.
99-138).
19. In reTroxel, 940 P.2d 698, 698-99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
20. Id. at 700 (recognizing that the statute should be limited for it to be
"consistent with the constitutional restrictions on state interference with
parents' fundamental liberty interest in the 'care, custody, and management' of
their children"); see also Smith, 969 P.2d. at 31 (asserting that "[plarents have a
right to limit visitation of their children with third persons").
21. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (explaining that the court
unconstitutionally infringed upon Granville's right to "make decisions
concerning the care custody and control of her two daughters").
22. Id. at 71-72; see, e.g., Kyle 0. v. Donald R., 85 Cal. App. 4th 848, 850
(2000) ("Following the lead of Troxel we need not decide whether California's
nonparental visitation statute.., is unconstitutional on its face."); Department
of Soc. and Rehab. Servs. v. Paillet, 16 P.3d 962, 971 (Kan. 2000) (noting that
the Troxel Court did not rule on the validity of nonparental visitations statutes
per se, thus finding that the Kansas grandparent visitation statute was not
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This Comment first discusses the common law roots of
parental autonomy rights and the subsequent development of
grandparent and third party visitation statutes. Second, this
Comment outlines the Supreme Court precedent relating to
family privacy and parental autonomy. Next, this Comment
analyzes the fragmented opinion issued by the Supreme Court
in Troxel and addresses how each Justice's opinion relates to the
current statutory law governing grandparent and third party
visitation. Finally, this Comment suggests how, in light of
Troxel, state legislatures should utilize open-ended standing
provisions and codify a legal presumption into the visitation
statutes in favor of parents to advance effectively the policy
behind visitation rights and to protect simultaneously
fundamental parental rights.
I. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF VISITATION STATUTES
A. Common Law Foundation of Parental Rights
1. Parents' Moral Obligation To Care for Their Children Gives
Rise to a Right of Parental Autonomy
Common law provided grandparents with no legal right to
access their grandchildren, and, therefore, they had no standing
to petition the courts for ordered visitation. Parents, on the
other hand, maintained complete discretion over who could
spend time with and influence their children. This
unconstitutional).
23. In re Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); see also Bronstein v. Bronstein,
434 So. 2d 780, 782 (Ala. 1983); Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629-30 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1947); Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60, 61-62 (111. 1976); Hicks v.
Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1989) ("Before the enactment of the
grandparents' visitation statute in 1976... it was a statutory fact that
grandparents could visit with their grandchildren only with parental
permission."). In re Reiss is often cited as one of the first cases to state
explicitly the common law position that refused to recognize third party
standing to petition for court-ordered visitation. ScoTr E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW
OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 172 (1992); Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, Statutory
Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the
Child, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 387, 388 (1977). But see Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430
N.E.2d 652, 653 (Ill. App. 1981) (rejecting a father's argument that the
grandparent visitation order should be void because grandparents lacked
explicit statutory authority to petition for visitation with their grandchildren).
24. See Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d at 63 ("The right to determine the third parties
who are to share in the custody and influence of and participate in the
visitation privileges with the children should vest primarily with the parent who
[Vol. 50:717734
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centralization of authority was a necessary function of states'
reliance on parents to raise their citizens and the corresponding
duty of parents to provide their children with stability, financial
security, health care, education, and moral values.25 In order to
carry out these duties effectively, parents must have the
authority to act in the interest of their children without state
26interference. Courts have recognized this arrangement and
have viewed parents' obligation to foster ties between their
children and third parties, including grandparents, as strictly a
"moral, not a legal obligation. "27
is charged with the daily responsibility of rearing the children."); In re Reiss, 15
So. at 152.
25. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72; Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1068-69 (Del.
Fain. Ct. 1987); see also SANFORD N. KATz, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 3-14 (1971).
"Grandparents, as a general rule, are not charged with the responsibilities of
raising their grandchildren ... and, absent such a custodial relationship, no
liberty interest is conferred upon them." Ward, 537 A.2d at 1068-69. In
addition, Katz discussed societal expectations regarding the family's role in
raising children. KATZ, supra, at 3-14. American society is built upon the
notion that the immediate family will accept responsibility for raising its
youngest children and the state must step in upon the failure of the parents to
do so. See id.; see also Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest
Proposal for the Twenty-first Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at
Children's Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 396-400 (2000) (suggesting
that parents' legal and moral duty to care for their children is based upon the
state's interest in preventing children from burdening the community at large).
26. See Odell, 177 P.2d at 629 ('The legal obligations of parenthood include
the duties of support, of care and protection, and of education . . . [tiherefor[e],
the law recognizes certain rights in the parent."); In re Reiss, 15 So. at 152 ("To
permit [third parties] to intervene would occasion embarrassment and
annoyance.. .[and] it would injuriously hinder proper paternal authority by
dividing it."); see also KALz, supra note 25, at 4. Katz suggests that the doctrine
of parental right to custody was rooted in the view that children constitute
property. Id. Gradually, the focus shifted from children as property to the
implications of the parent-child relationship. Id.
27. Bronstein, 434 So. 2d at 782; see also In re Reiss, 15 So. at 152 ("[Tlhe
obligation ordinarily to visit grandparents is moral and not legal."); FRIEDMAN,
supra note 23, at 172 (noting that Reiss is often cited for its proposition that
grandparent visitation is a moral, not legal obligation, and thus, not enforceable
by courts). In re Reiss is one of the earliest cases that considered a request for
court-ordered grandparent visitation. In re Reiss, 15 So. at 151. In In re Reiss,
a grandmother sued her son-in-law to compel him to send her two
grandchildren to visit her at her home. Id. at 152; see also Borzi, supra note
23, at 388 n.7. The court recognized that the grandmother's desire to maintain
a relationship with her grandchildren was motivated by affection, but was
reluctant to arbitrate between two adults who could not resolve this issue
because of "bad blood." In Re Reiss, 15 So. at 152-53. The court held for the
father because (1) it is against the children's interest to undermine parental
authority; and (2) because a court order could not effectively resolve a family
dispute. Id. Whatever laws of nature require parents to foster relationships
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:717
Although the common law assumed that parents had the duty
and the authority to control the upbringing of their children, the
state retained the power and the responsibility ultimately to
protect its defenseless citizens. 28 The doctrine of parens patriae29
allows the state to intervene when parents cannot provide their
children with adequate care. 30 At common law, the state
exercised its parens patriae power only when parents violated
their legal obligations to their children through abuse or
neglect .
In the absence of specific legislation on this subject, courts
historically have resisted attempting to resolve internal family
conflicts.32 Courts have reasoned that any interference with
among children and grandchildren are based in individual morals and are not
required by law. Id at 152.
28. See Bostock, supra note 11, at 328 (noting that the state's parens
patriae power authorizes state action aimed to protect children from severe
harm).
29. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1991). Black's defines parens
patriae as:
[Literally, 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to role of state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles.., and, in child custody determinations, when acting on
behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the
principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of
themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from
their parents. It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-
sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people,
interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc ..... In the
United States, parens patriae function belongs with the states.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. KATz, supra note 25, at 4 ("Under the doctrine of parens patriae the
state has invoked power in unusual circumstances to promote certain policies
for the protection of children." (footnote omitted)).
31. See id.; In re Reiss, 15 So. at 152. "There may be cases of downright
wrong and inhumanity" that would justify judicial intervention. Id. But, "[illl
feeling and bad blood" between a parent and grandparent does not justify
judicial action. Id.; see generally Clark, supra note 25 (discussing the
philosophical policies behind the parens patriae power and suggesting reasons
for limiting it). Clark argues that state involvement in family relationships
harms the interests involved because family autonomy rights usually outweigh
the state's interests. Id.
32. See, e.g., In re Reiss, 15 So. at 152. The father, in refusing to take his
children to visit their grandmother, "owes no account to any one for his
motives. They may be so intimate that the honor of the family requires that
they shall remain a secret." Id. The In re Reiss court's reluctance to overrule
parental discretion did not reflect the severity of the issues before them. Id.
The court expressed sympathy for the parties involved, but acknowledged that
even though family disputes could produce the fiercest arguments, the court
did not constitute the appropriate venue for determining the outcome of these
736
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parental decision-making would undermine parental authority
and impede parents from accomplishing the legal and moral
duties imposed by society.3 Moreover, courts have recognized
that the family unit is better equipped than the courts to resolve
family disputes effectively.34 Even if a court attempted to legally
require a parent to consent to grandparent-grandchild contact, it
could not repair relationships or monitor adult behavior.3 5 In
fact, some commentators argue that allowing grandparents to
sue parents may further isolate members of a divided family,
and the resulting legal battle could detrimentally impact the
child.3
Common law courts, however, did recognize equitable
exceptions to the blanket rule against interfering with parental
autonomy.37  Some courts granted visitation rights to
conflicts. Id. at 152-53. For courts expressing concern regarding the situation
underlying the parties' claims, see Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1071 (Del.
Fain. Ct. 1987) ("It is particularly regrettable that children who love both their
parents and their grandparents have become pawns in animosities and
differences among adults."), and Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Ky. 1989)
("[wihile we certainly sympathize with the feelings of the grandmother who has
been cutoff from visitation with her grandchild" the language of the adoption
statutes prevents her from obtaining a legal remedy).
33. In re Reiss, 15 So. at 152; see also Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) ('rhe supremacy of the mother and father in their
own home in regard to the control of their children is generally recognized.");
Ward, 537 A.2d at 1069 ('The common law rule against coercing grandparent
visitation over parental objection demonstrates a respect for family privacy and
parental autonomy.").
34. See, e.g., Ward, 537 A.2d at 1069 (observing that the common law
recognized that the "'government is ill-equipped to dictate the details of social
interaction among family members'"); In re Reiss, 15 So. at 153 ('The ties of
nature will prove more efficacious in restoring kindly family relations than the
coercive measures which must follow judicial intervention."); see also Patricia S.
Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 109,
113 (1988). But see Grandparents Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services of the Select Comm. on Aging,
102d Cong. 54-55 (1991) (statement of Arthur Kornhaber, M.D., President,
Foundation for Grandparenting) (suggesting that there is a role for judges to set
guidelines for feuding families and "sentenc[ing] the family to healing")
[hereinafter Generational Bonds].
35. See Ward, 537 A.2d at 1069.
36. E.g., BARRY BRICKLIN, PH. D., THE CUSTODY EVALUATION HANDBOOK 200
(1995) (commenting that it is hard evaluate tell whether grandparents will use
their statutory standing wisely and noting that if there is already a divorce or
family disruption, a lawsuit by the grandparents may increase the amount of
conflict the child faces).
37. See, e.g., Loveless v. Michalak, 522 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(upholding an order granting grandparents visitation with a child, in the
absence of a death or divorce, because the parents' abandonment of the child
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:717
grandparents under exceptional circumstances, typically
characterized by an "established, close, and meaningful
relationship" between the petitioning grandparents and their
grandchildren, as well as a broken nuclear family due to divorce,
separation, or death.39
2. Constitutional Interpretation Indicates Parents' Fundamental
Right To Raise Their Children
Although federal statutes do not identify parental rights, they
do receive constitutional protection. 40 The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment 4' has been interpreted to protect a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. ''42
constituted "special circumstances" warranting judicial intervention).
38. See id.; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652, 654 (111. App. Ct. 1981)
(granting visitation to a grandparent who had daily contact with a child
following the death of the child's parent); Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 71 N.E.2d 920,
920-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) (granting visitation after the death of the child's
father in World War I); Solomon v. Solomon, 49 N.E.2d 807, 807-08, 818, 822-
23 (11. App. Ct. 1943) (allowing paternal grandparents to seek visitation while
their son, the grandchild's father, was on active duty in the in the Armed
Services); Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 827 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(allowing grandparent visitation of an child born out of wedlock); see also JOHN
C. MAYOUE, COMPETING INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAw 143-44 (1998) (noting that at
common law, courts focused on the facts of each case and occasionally issued
visitation orders for grandparents if they had a close relationship with the child
and there was a disruption in the nuclear family).
39. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1067 (indicating that in cases in which courts have
found grandparents to have a protected interest in their grandchildren, the
grandparents had provided day-to-day care and nurturing for the minors, which
formed a custodial relationship); Burns, supra note 10, at 62. But see
Robertson v. Robertson, 164 P.2d 52, 57 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (stating that
even though the parents are divorced, the grandparent's "right, if it can be
called that, is no different from that of any third person or stranger").
40. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected."); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982) (noting the Supreme Court's "historical recognition that freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state ... shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
42. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Fourteenth
Amendment's promise that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due
process of law has been interpreted to Include more than "fair process" and "the
absence of physical restraint." Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 719
(1997). Fundamental rights and liberties that are not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights or specifically mentioned in the text the Constitution fall within the
Fourteenth's Amendment's protected liberty interest. Id. at 720. In 1905, the
Supreme Court, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905), struck down a
738
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Specifically, state and federal courts have recognized the "liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control, 43  and the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from interfering with this liberty."
In some instances, however, states may regulate matters that
affect the family unit.45 The application of grandparent visitation
statutes raises the issues of what extent parents are protected
from state interference and when the state may exercise its
46authority to regulate in the interests of its citizens.
B. Introduction of Grandparent Visitation Statutes
1. Demographic Shifts Reflect a Changing Society
In the past half-century, our society's demographics have
changed significantly, modifying the shape of the American
family.47 The divorce rate has nearly doubled, and the number
of births out of wedlock continues to rise .4' These two factors
state statute that regulated the hours of bakers because it was "unreasonable
and entirely arbitrary" and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The
Lochner Court held that there is a "limit to the valid exercise of the police
power... [oltherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and
the legislatures of the States would have unbounded power." Id. at 56 Lochner
is now thought to stand for an era of inappropriate judicial interference with a
state's economic policy. Cf. infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Scalia's concerns that the Troxel Court acted without
authority by federalizing family law policy).
43. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see, e.g.,
Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855
S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993).
44. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
45. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("ITihe family itself is not beyond regulation in
the public interest."); see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing
a state's parens patriae power).
46. See infra Part ID, (discussing how state courts and the Supreme Court
have addressed the constitutional limitations of grandparent visitation
statutes).
47. See Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Olympia
J. Snowe).
48. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1999, No. 91 (1 19th ed. 1999) (recording that, in 1950, there were 2.6 divorces
per 1000 people and, in 1997, there were 4.3 divorces per 1000 people); Beth
Bailey, Broken Bonds: The Effects of Divorce on Society, Family, and Children,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1997, at 6 (observing that the United States has the highest
divorce rate among advanced Western nations).
49. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1999, No. 100 (119h ed. 1999) (recording that between 1980 and 1996 births to
unmarried women increased from 18.4% to 32.4%).
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have increased the number of children raised in single-parent
households.5 0 Meanwhile, an individual's life expectancy has
risen, and people are retiring earlier and wealthier.5  As a result,
members of the older generation often have the time and the
resources to play an active role in their adult children's and
grandchildren's lives at a time when such assistance is
desperately needed 2
50. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Children Under 18 Years Living With
Mother Only, by Marital Status of Mother: 1960 to Present
<http: //www.census.gov/population/ socdemo/ms-la/tabch-5.txt> (last
modified Jan. 7, 1999) (recording that, in 1960, approximately 5,105,000.
children lived solely with their mothers; 1,210,000 of these single mothers had
divorced and 221,000 of these single mothers never married; and in 1998,
approximately 16,634,000 children lived solely with their mothers; 5,704,000 of
these single mothers were divorced, and 6,700,000 of these single mothers
never married); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Children Under 18 Years Living With
Father Only, by Marital Status of Father: 1960 to Present
<http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ms-la/tabch-6.txt> (last
modified Jan. 7, 1999) (recording that, in 1960, approximately 724,000 children
lived solely with their father; 129,000 of these single fathers were divorced, and
22,000 of these single fathers were never married; and, in 1998 approximately
3,143,000 children lived solely with their fathers; 1,397,000 of these single
fathers were divorced and 1,046,000 of these single fathers never married).
51. See Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Serv. of the House Select Comm. on
Aging, 97th Cong. 1-2 (1982) (noting that many Americans will be grandparents
for twenty to thirty years).
52. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1999 No. 85 (recording that, in 1980, 2,306,000 children lived in their
grandparents' home: in 1,008,000 of these households one parent was present
and in 988,000 of these households, no parents were present; and, by 1998,
the number of children living their grandparents' home increased to 3,989,000:
in 2,068,000 of these households, one parent was present and in 1,417,000 of
these households, no parents were present); Generational Bonds, supra note 34,
at I (opening statement of Chairman Thomas J. Downey) (noting the increase in
grandparents who raise their grandchildren when the parents cannot); id. at
84-85 (statement of Sharron Roller) (discussing her experience raising her
grandchild born to her teenage son). The number of organizations that have
formed to aid these grandparents also evidences the increase in grandparents
raising their grandchildren. See American Association for Retired People,
Support Groups for Raising Grandchildren
<http://www.aarp.org/confacts/health/grandsupport.html> (last visited Feb.
24, 2001). The American Association for Retired People (AARP) Grandparent
Information Center, the Brookdale Foundation Group, and Generations United
are a few examples of organizations that provide resources for grandparents
raising children. See id. (listing organizations that provide information to
grandparent care givers).
740
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2. Legislative Recognition of Changes in the Nuclear Family
Through Creation of Grandparent Visitation Statutes
Whether due to marriage, divorce, relocation, or another
significant event, the American family's changing demographics
have increased intergenerational conflicts that sometimes
prohibit contact between grandparents and their
grandchildren. In recognition of these conflicts, a handful of
states enacted legislation in the late 1960s that provided
grandparents with a statutory right to petition courts for• • 54
intervention. Other states followed suit, and today all fifty
states have adopted grandparent visitation statutes. These
statutes are viewed as a codification of the equitable exceptions
recognized at common law because they apply only in the
limited circumstances surrounding divorce or the death of a
parent.5 6  Although grandparent visitation statutes are not
uniform,57  they are characterized by two analytical
53. See Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 9 (statement of John H.
Pickering, Chair, Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, American Bar
Association, Washington, DC) (noting the increase in litigation regarding
grandparents' rights because of the changes in American society).
54. See id. at 27; see also Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Ky. 1989)
("The grandparents' visitation statute was an appropriate response to the
change in the demographics of domestic relations, mirrored by the dramatic
increase in the divorce rate and in the number of children born to unmarried
parents, and the increasing independence and alienation within the extended
family inherent in a mobile society."); Judith L. Shandling, Note, The
Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 118, 119 (1986) (observing that forty-one states enacted visitation statutes
after 1975).
55. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 n.* (2000); Shandling, supra
note 54, at 119 (observing that most statutes were enacted in the 1980s, and by
1986, forty-eight states had grandparent visitation statutes).
56. See Hicks, 764 S.W.2d at 70; Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 3
(statement of Rep. Snowe) (stating grandparent visitation rights were generally
recognized following the death or divorce of a child's parents); Burns, supra
note 10, at 62 (arguing that the codification of the special circumstances
justifying ordered grandparent visitation at common law signaled to the courts
that they should defer to the legislature to specify the particular circumstances
under which ordered grandparent visitation is appropriate).
57. See Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 2 (statement of Chairman
Thomas J. Downey) (noting that the scope of grandparent visitation statutes
vary widely). Chairman Downey points out that because state grandparent
statutes are not uniform, the efforts of grandparents seeking visitation in one
state may be thwarted if the child moves to a state that has different
grandparent visitation laws. Id.
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components. 58  First, such statutes define the circumstances
under which grandparents have standing to petition for court-
ordered visitation.59  Second, these statutes articulate the
58. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 102D
CONGRESS, LEGAL OVERVIEW OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS 4 (1991)
(hereinafter RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT]; Bostock, supra note 11, at 332
(describing the basic two-step structure of visitation statutes).
59. See RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 58, at 4. The complexity of
grandparent visitation statutes varies from state to state. Compare TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. §153.433 & §153.434 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000), with MD. CODE
ANN., [FAM. LAW] § 9-102 (1999). The Texas statute, entitled "Possession of and
Access to Grandchild," states:
The court shall order reasonable access to a grandchild by a
grandparent If:
at the time the relief is requested, at least one biological or adoptive
parent of the child has not had that parent's parental rights
terminated; and
access is in the best interest of the child, and at least one of the
following facts is present::
[1] the grandparent requesting access to the child is a parent of a parent of
the child and that parent of the child has been incarcerated in jail or prison
during the three-month period preceding the filing of the petition or has been
found by a court to be incompetent or is dead;
[21 the parents of the child are divorced or have been living apart for the
three-month period preceding the filing of the petition or a suit for the
dissolution of the parents' marriage is pending;
[31 the child has been abused or neglected by a parent of the child;
[41 the child has been adjudicated to be a child in need of supervision or a
delinquent child under Title 3;
[5 the grandparent requesting access to the child is the parent of a person
whose parent-child relationship with the child has been terminated by court
order; or
[61 the child has resided with the grandparent requesting access to the
child for at least six months within the 24-month period preceding the filing of
the petition.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433. Another Texas statute entitled "Limitation on
Right to Request Access" states:
A biological or adoptive grandparent may not request possession of or
access to a grandchild if:
each of the biological parents of the grandchild has:
[11 died;
[21 had the person's parental rights terminated; or
[31 executed an affidavit of waiver of interest in child or an affidavit of
relinquishment of parental rights under Chapter 161 and the affidavit
designates an authorized agency, licensed child-placing agency, or
person other than the child's stepparent as the managing conservator
of the child; and
the grandchild has been adopted, or is the subject of a pending suit for
adoption, by a person other than the child's stepparent.
TEx FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.434. Maryland's visitation statute, entitled "Petition
by grandparents for visitation," by comparison provides: "An equity court may:
consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a grandparent;
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standards by which judges must abide in order to grant a
visitation petition.6 0 All fifty states require any grant of visitation
to be in the child's best interests, although the legislatures often
leave this standard undefined .
and if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant visitation
rights to the grandparent." MD. CODE ANN., [FAM. LAw] § 9-102.
60. See RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 58, at 4.
61. Id. at 22 (noting that very few states articulate the best interest
standard in the text of their statutes); see also Generational Bonds, supra note
34 (noting that the downfall of the indefinite "best interests" standard is the
lack of restraint on judicial discretion in making decisions regarding family
relationships); John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation
by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351, 385-86 (1998) (suggesting that
although the best interest standard may be appropriate in disputes between
parents, it is too vague to sufficiently guide judges in non-parent visitation
disputes); Shandling, supra note 54, at 122-25 (criticizing the best interest
standard as being indeterminate). The states that do define the best interests
standard typically enumerate several factors for the courts to consider in
determining whether ordered visitation is in the child's best interest. E.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2000). The Virginia statute states:
Best interests of the child.; visitation-In determining best interests of
a child for purposes of determining custody or visitation arrangements
including any pendente lite orders pursuant to § 20-103, the court
shall consider the following:
The age and physical and mental condition of the child, giving due
consideration to the child's changing developmental needs;
The age and physical and mental condition of each parent;
The relationship existing between each parent and each child, giving
due consideration to the positive involvement with the child's life, the
ability to accurately assess and meet the emotional, intellectual and
physical needs of the child;
The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important
relationships of the child, including but not limited to siblings, peers
and extended family members;
The role which each parent has played and will play in the future, in
the upbringing and care of the child;
The propensity of each parent to actively support the child's contact
and relationship with the other parent, including whether a parent has
unreasonably denied the other parent access to or visitation with the
child;
The relative willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to
maintain a close and continuing relationship with the child, and the
ability of each parent to cooperate in and resolve disputes regarding
matters affecting the child;
The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to
be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to
express such a preference;
Any history of family abuse as that term is defined in § 16.1-228; and
Such other factors as the court deems necessary and proper to the
determination.
The judge shall communicate to the parties the basis of the decision
either orally or in writing.
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In addition, although the law of domestic relations usually
resides solely within the domain of the states, the movement to
strengthen grandparents' rights through the enactment of
grandparent visitation statutes has gained the attention and
support of the federal government . In 1983, after a
congressional hearing on grandparents' rights, the Senate and
the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution,
which found that "grandparents play a vital role in millions of
American families" and urged states to develop and to enact a
uniform statute that would allow grandparents to petition state
courts for visitation privileges with their grandchildren.4 The
House Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee of
Human Services followed up the resolution with several hearings
to assess the adequacy of the states' grandparent visitation
statutes and to discuss the possibility of further congressional
action. 69 Even the executive branch responded to this issue;
President Clinton, at the urging of Congress, declared 1995 'The
Year of the Grandparent."66
Grandparents' rights received recognition and affirmation from
the federal government due in large part to the wealthy and
expansive seniors' lobby. The lobbying efforts of seniors have
Id.; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. § 752.01(2), § 751.01(2) (1997); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
125.480(4)(1)(b) (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d(II) (1992); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05. 1(B) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1999): OKLA STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 5(B) (West 1998).
62. See Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 2 (opening statement of
Chairman Thomas J. Downey) ("Congress did not then, and does not now, have
any general authority to legislate on family law questions .... ").
63. See Grandparents: New Roles and Responsibilities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Serv. of the Select Comm. on Aging, 103d Cong. 1 (1992)
(hereinafter Roles and Responsibilities] (opening statement of Chairman Thomas
J. Downey) ("[While Congress has no general legislative authority over family
law matters such as grandparent visitation... we have tried in many ways to
influence the States to adopt uniform grandparent visitation laws.").
64. H.R. Res. 45, 98th Cong. (1983); see also Generational Bonds, supra
note 34, at 2 (opening statement of Chairman Thomas J. Downey) (explaining
that the concurrent resolution regarding grandparent visitation was an indirect
attempt to influence the states' policies).
65. See Roles and Responsibilities, supra note 63, at 1 (opening statement of
Chairman Thomas J. Downey).
66. Proclamation No. 6766, 60 Fed. Reg. 4067 (Jan. 19, 1995).
67. See Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 2 ("lIlt is a well-known fact
that seniors are the most active lobby in this country, and when it comes to
grandparents there is no one group more united in their purpose ... without
the aid and support of these groups many grandparents would not know that
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made grandparents' rights, including grandparent visitation, an
important legal and political issue.6 8  Due to their strength in
numbers, wealth, and historical political activism, grandparents
command the attention of legislators at the state and federal
levels. 9 Lobby groups in support of grandparent visitation cite
the changes in demographics that gave rise to the earliest
legislation, and also promote legislation that secures rights that
are tied to their status as grandparents. °  Supporters of
grandparents' rights argue that grandchildren and grandparents
have a legal right to benefit from their unique relationship.7'
A number of states responded to this lobby and broadened
their grandparent visitation statutes.72  Instead of making
there is help for them out there .... "); Id. at 3 (statement of Representative
Olympia J. Snowe) ("The older population, of which an estimated 75 to 85
percent are grandparents, are retiring earlier, living longer, and are becoming
much more politically active.. . "1.
68. See H.R. Res. 45, 98th Cong. (1983); Bums, supra note 10, at 59
(noting that national grandparents' rights organization "besieged their
legislatures" to pass grandparent visitation laws).
69. See CHERLIN & FURSTENBURG, THE NEW AMERICAN GRANDPARENT 5 (1986)
("State legislators who worked for grandparents' rights undoubtedly were
motivated by the increasing proportion of older voters. . .. Voting against
grandparents is political suicide.").
70. See Generational Bonds, supra note 34, at 53 (statement of Arthur
Kornhaber, M.D., President, Foundation for Grandparenting, Lake Placid, New
York) (suggesting that contact between grandparents and grandchildren is a
"biological need"). Dr. Kornhaber also points out that the concept of the intact
nuclear family as a limit on court-ordered grandparent visitation is a
contradictory policy because grandparents and a parent form an "intact family"
as well. Id. On the eve of Supreme Court oral arguments in Troxel, the AARP
released a Grandparent Survey of 823 grandparents over the age of fifty.
American Association of Retired People, AARP Survey: Grandparents,
Grandchildren Have Strong Bond, Visit Often (released January 4, 2000)
available at <http://www.aarp.org/press/ 2000/nrO10400.html>. A press
release that accompanied the survey highlighted the strong bonds usually
present between grandparents and their grandchildren. Id. The survey found,
with a 3.5% margin for error, that 82% of grandparents had seen their
grandchildren and 85% had spoke with them on the phone in the month
previous to the interview. Id. Seventy-two percent had shared a meal in the
month previous to the interview, and the same number had purchased a gift for
the grandchildren in the preceding month. Id.
71. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1066 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1987) The
Ward court states that "the law increasingly acknowledges and respects the
relationship between grandparent and grandchild and has recognized certain
rights and duties which flow from such a relationship," but concludes that
interest in this relationship is never stronger than the interests of parents in
raising their children. Id. at 1067, 1069.
72. See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 632-33 (discussing the mutual
benefits of the grandparent-grandchild relationship and expressing its approval
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standing contingent upon a disruption in the nuclear family, as
do the statutes based on the equitable exceptions recognized at
common law, the broadened statutes grant standing based on
the status of being a grandparent.73  Fourteen states have
adopted open-ended statutes that grant standing to all
grandparents. 4 Six states have statutes that grant standing to
of the state legislature's enactment of the grandparent visitation statute in light
of these inherent benefits); Unprecedented Intrusion, supra note 12, at 30-31
(discussing how the grandparent lobby gave rise to the "open-ended"
grandparent visitation statute). Some states have created a statutory right to
grandparent visitation by requiring the court to grant such visitation. E.g., ALA.
CODE § 30-3-4.1 (1989 & Supp. 2000) (providing that the court "shall grant any
grandparent" visitation so long as it is in the child's best interests and
establishing a rebutable presumption in favor of grandparents); HAW. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 571-46(7) (1999) (providing that visitation "shall be awarded" to
grandparents "unless it is shown that rights of visitation are detrimental to the
best interests of the child"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997) (providing
that grandparents "must be granted reasonable visitation rights" unless it is not
in the child's best interest). In 1996, the Michigan legislature changed from
allowing a grandparent to seek "visitation" to allowing a grandparent to seek
"grandparenting time." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 1993 & Supp.
2000).
73. See MAYOUE, supra note 38, at 143-46 (1998) (explaining that the two
basic types of grandparent visitation statutes are those derived from equity and
those that are open-ended and noting that the rational behind open-ended
statutes is that visitation with grandparents is generally in a child's best
interests).
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1995) (authorizing the court to
grant grandparents visitation of a minor child "subject to such conditions and
limitations as it deems equitable"); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(7) (Michie
1999) (authorizing the court to grant grandparents reasonable visitation "unless
it is shown that rights of visitation are detrimental to the best interests of the
child"); IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (Michie 1996) (authorizing court to grant
reasonable visitation to grandparents "upon a proper showing that visitation
would be in the bests interests of the child"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(i)
(Michie 1999) (authorizing a court to grant visitation to grandparents "if it
determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so"); MD. CODE ANN.,
[FAM. LAW] § 9-102(2) (Michie 1999) (authorizing a court to grant reasonable
visitation of a grandchild if it "finds it to be in the best interests of the child");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402(1)(3) (West 1997) (authorizing a court to grant
visitation to grandparents if the grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation
for a period exceeding ninety days); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-101 (1997)
(authorizing a court to grant reasonable rights to contact with a grandchild "if it
would be in the bests interests of the child"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72
(McKinney 1999) (authorizing a grandparent to petition for visitation rights in
any circumstances which "warrant the equitable intervention of the court"). But
see Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.2d 497, 500 (2000) (holding the New York statute
facially unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with parental
autonomy rights). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997) (requiring a court
to grant reasonable visitation rights "unless a finding is made that visitation is
not in the best interests of the minor"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1998) (providing
that a grandparent "shall have reasonable rights of visitation to the child if the
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grandparents if they have established or attempted to establish
relationships with their grandchildren. Two states allow
grandparents to petition for visitation at any time unless the
children's natural or adoptive parents are living together and
district court deems it to be in the best interest of the child"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 25-4-52 (Michie 1999) (authorizing a court to "grant grandparents
reasonable rights of visitation with their grandchild, with or without petition by
the grandparents, if it is in the best interests of the grandchild"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-5-2 (1998 & Supp. 2000) (authorizing a court to grant visitation
rights to a grandparent if it is in the best interests of the child, the grandparent
is a fit and proper person, repeated attempts to visit with the grandchild have
been thwarted, court intervention is necessary, and the grandparent rebutted
the presumption that the parent's decision to restrict visitation was reasonable);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-5(a) (Michie 1999) (requiring the court to grant reasonable
visitation to a grandparent if "visitation would be in the best interests of the
child and would not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship");
Wis. STAT. § 767.245(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (authorizing a court to grant
reasonable visitation rights to a grandparent if the it is in the best interest of
the child); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1999) (authorizing a grandparent
to bring an action for visitation rights and authorizing the court to grant the
petition if it is in the best interest of the child and the parent's rights are not
substantially impaired). The North Dakota statute was invalidated by Hoff v.
Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285 (1999). See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text
(discussing the Hoff decision).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065(a) (Michie 1998) (allowing a grandparent to
establish reasonable rights of visitation if "(1) the grandparent has established
or attempted to establish ongoing personal contact with the child; and (2)
visitation by the grandparent is in the child's best interest"); CAL. FAM. CODE §
3104(a) (West 1999) (authorizing a court to grant reasonable visitation to a
grandparent if the court "(1) finds that there is a preexisting relationship
between the grandparent and grandchild that has engendered a bond such that
visitation is in the best interest of the child; [and] (2) [bjalances the interest of
the child in having visitation with the grandparent against the right of the
parents to exercise parental authority"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 19-A § 1803(1)
(West 1998) (granting standing to a grandparent to petition the court for
reasonable visitation if "[tihere is a sufficient existing relationship between the
grandparent and the child" or the grandparent has made a "sufficient effort" to
establish such a relationship); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(2)(a), (b) (1999)
(authorizing a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if "the
grandparent of the child had established a viable relationship with the child
and the parent or custodian of the child unreasonably denied the grandparent
visitation rights with the child; and [tihat visitation rights of the grandparent
with the child would be in the best interests of the child"); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.1211(a)(A), (B) (1999) (authorizing grandparents to petition the court for
visitation rights if they have established or attempted to establish "ongoing
personal contact with the child" and the custodian of the child denied them
reasonable visitation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (1996) (authorizing a court to
grant visitation rights to grandparents if it is in the best interest of the child,
the grandparents are fit and proper people, the grandparents attempted to visit
the child and were denied visitation and they rebutted the presumption that the
parent's decision was reasonable).
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both object to the visitation. 6 Once the standing requirement is
satisfied, all fifty states require the grandparents to demonstrate
that visitation is in the best interests of the children by the
state's applicable standard. 7
3. Third Party Visitation Statutes
The changing shape of American families has also caused
third parties, other than grandparents, to seek visitation rights. 8
Third parties, including stepparents,79  siblings and other
relatives,80 foster parents,8' prospective adoptive parents, and
82biological parents' non-marital partners who play an essential
role in a child's life may also want to obtain visitation rights with
a minor child. 3 However, other third parties have not had the
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1031(7)(a) (1999) (authorizing a court to
grant reasonable visitation to grandparents unless "the natural or adoptive
parents of the child are cohabiting as husband and wife, and both parents
object"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b)(1999 and Supp. 1999) (authorizing a
grandparent to file an action for visitation unless "the parents of the minor child
are not separated and the child is living with both of the parents").
77. See RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 58, at 4. Only a limited
number of states define the best interests of the child. See supra note 61
(listing state statutes that list factors used to evaluate the best interests of the
child).
78. See generally Gregory, supra note 7, (addressing issues that arise when
a legal stranger seeks court-ordered visitation of a minor child).
79. See, e.g., Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Neb. 1981)
(holding that a stepfather was entitled to visitation with his stepdaughter
because of his parent-like relationship to her); Cox v. Williams, 502 N.W.2d
128, 131 (Wisc. 1993) (holding that a former stepparent did not have standing
to petition for visitation of a child of deceased husband).
80. See, e.g., In re Tamara R., 764 A.2d 844, 847-50 (Md. App. 2000)
(allowing a child deemed "in need of assistance" by Social Services to petition for
visitation with her other siblings); Noonan v. Noonan, 547 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526-27
(Kings 1989) (allowing a mother to sue on behalf of her two children to visit with
their two half-siblings who had previously resided with them).
81. See, e.g., In re Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1979)
(denying foster parents visitation rights after child was returned to biological
father and stepmother).
82. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.L.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892, 894 (Mass. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999) (holding that the biological mother's former
lesbian partner could be granted visitation in equity because she was the child's
de facto parent); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) (upholding a
grant of visitation rights to a biological mother's former same-sex partner); In Re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wisc. 1995) (holding that biological
mother's former lesbian partner did not have standing to seek visitation of a
child under the state's third party visitation statute, but that the court had
equitable authority to grant such visitation).
83. See supra notes 78-82 (listing cases in which a third party, other than a
grandparent, petitioned the court for access to a child); see also Eric G.
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same success as grandparents in influencing states to provide
them with a statutory remedy.84 Only a limited number of state
legislatures recognize that a non-parent's close relationship with
a child warrants a grant of visitation rights and have thus
enacted statutes granting limited standing to third parties.
8 5
Andersen, Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal
Standards, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 935, 945-46 (1998). Andersen suggests that a
non-parent's interest in visitation with a child stems from two possible
circumstances: a right derivative of the parent's interest in the child or a right
stemming from a developed relationship with the child. Id. at 945. Andersen
suggests that the non-parent must have "commenced the relationship in good
faith and in a socially approved context" and further observes that courts will
consider the interest of the third party based on the legitimacy of the third
party's relationship with the minor child. Id. Therefore, a grandparent would
have a stronger interest in visitation than a non-relative, and a stepparent
would have a stronger interest in a child than does a non-marital cohabiting
partner.
84. See Gregory, supra note 61, at 371 ("No other group of legal strangers to
children has been as favorably treated with respect to visitation."). Even if other
third parties are given statutory rights to petition the court for visitation, they
usually are not granted the same visitation rights as grandparents. Id. at 351-
52 (observing that "grandparents, aided by a raft of legislation and judicial
decisions, fare infinitely better when petitioning for visitation" than other
interested third parties). For example, California authorizes courts to grant "the
children, parents, and grandparents of the deceased parent" visitation rights of
a child. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3102(a) (West 1999). However, grandparents may
seek visitation rights at any time. Id. § 3104.
85. Six states include provisions granting siblings, as well as grandparents,
standing to petition courts for ordered visitation. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3102(a); ILL.
COMP. STAT., ch. 750, § 5/607(b) (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West
2000); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (Michie Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN.
9:2-7.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-24.3 (1996). Four
states have enacted a separate provision to allow siblings to petition for
visitation of their minor sibling. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-13-102 (Michie 1998);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1999);
R.I. GEN. LAwS §15-5-24.4 (1996 & Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(44)
(Law. Co-op. 1999). Eleven states will allow any party, regardless of their legal
status, that has a significant relationship with the child to petition a court for
visitation rights. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 10, §
1031(1) (1999); LA. CIV. CODE ANN., art. 136 (West 1999); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.051B (Anderson Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-124.1, 20-124.2
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993); WyO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1999). Two states have enacted a statute allowing
stepparents to petition for visitation of a former stepchild. CAL. FAM. CODE §
3101, WiS. STAT. ANN. § 880.155 (West 1993-94).
Third party visitation has generated a large amount of scholarly
commentary, with many authors urging a redevelopment of the basic principals
that guide the law governing domestic relations. See Andersen, supra note 83,
at 1000-01 (suggesting that as traditional legal standards relating to parent-
nonparent disputes are challenged, courts should develop standards relative to
the status of the parties involved in each case); Gregory, supra note 7, at 372-
382 (discussing several different commentators' approaches to third party
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C. Constitutional Limitations on Grandparent Visitation Statutes
Grandparent visitation statutes raise questions regarding the
constitutional protection of parental autonomy and the ability of
a state to foster and protect grandparent-grandchild
relationships.16  In Troxel v. Granville,17 the Supreme Court
reviewed a Washington Supreme Court ruling that the state's
third party visitation statute was unconstitutional. Prior to
Troxel, several grandparent visitation statutes were challenged in
state supreme courts on the ground that the statutes violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 Critics
argue that a visitation order issued over the objections of fit
parents constitutes an impermissible infringement of the
parents' fundamental liberty interest in raising their children.90
visitation rights); Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of
the New ALI Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 769 (1999) (discussing the ALI's
approach to third party visitation rights and urging courts to reexamine their
approach to the issue); Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.:
Neglecting the Best Interests of the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK.
L. REv. 1021, 1061 (1992) (suggesting that legislative changes regarding third
party visitation could provide for more uniform and consistent judicial
decisions); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Co-Parent Visitation: Acknowledging the
Reality of Two Mother Families, 9 LAw & SEX. 151, 162 (1999) (noting that
although the Massachusetts Supreme Court clarified the de facto parent
doctrine, the court did not decide whether de facto parents enjoy the same
rights as biological parents).
86. See infra Part.I.D (discussing various state supreme court cases which
consider the constitutional constraints of grandparent visitation statutes).
87. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
88. Id. at 60; see In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998),
cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("[Nlor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); see also Brooks
v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1993) (holding that Georgia's
grandparent visitation statute violated the Constitution); King v. King, 828
S.W.2d 630, 632-33 (Ky. 1992) (holding that Kentucky's grandparent visitation
statute was constitutional and upholding a grant of visitation to paternal
grandfather over the objections of the child's two married biological parents);
Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a
grant of visitation rights to grandparents where a child's family was intact was a
less than substantial encroachment on the parents' rights and thus the statute
did not interfere with the parents' fundamental right to raise their child); Hoff v.
Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291 (N.D. 1999) (holding that North Dakota's
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutionally infringed upon parents'
fundamental rights to raise their children).
90. See Bostock, supra note 11, at 355; Burns, supra note 10, at 80-82; see
also supra note 12 (listing commentators who have criticized grandparent
visitation statutes as an unconstitutional infringement of parental rights).
Attempts by grandparents to seek the protection of the fourteenth amendment
have not succeeded. See, e.g., Cox v. Stayton, 619 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Ark.
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Both common law and Supreme Court precedent firmly
establish that an individual's right to be free from state
interference in matters regarding his or her family is a
fundamental right protected by the constitution. 9' More
specifically, a parent's fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of his or her children without interference from the
state is one of the most firmly established fundamental rights
92related to family privacy.
This liberty interest was first articulated by the Supreme Court
in Meyer v. Nebrask 3 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.94 In both
cases, the Court struck down a state statute because it
unreasonably infringed upon "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control."95 In Meyer, the Supreme Court invalidated
a Nebraska provision that prohibited teaching children a foreign
language before they reached the ninth grade. In Pierce, the
Court invalidated an Oregon statute requiring children between
the ages of eight and sixteen to attend a local public school.9 7 In
both opinions, the Court recognized that a state has the
authority to regulate and protect the public and promote the
1993). The court in Cox found that a statute prohibiting a court from ordering
grandparent visitation of a child after adoption did not violate the grandparents'
Fourteenth amendment rights because there is no fundamental right to access
one's grandchildren. Id. at 620.
91. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (observing "this
Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Our
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."); see generally David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family
Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REv. 527 (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court's protection
of family privacy rights).
92. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ('The history and culture of Western civilization reflect
a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.").
93. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
94. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also Meyer, supra note 91, at 533 (citing Meyer
and Pierce as the "foundational family privacy cases").
95. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-535 (citing Meyer); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at
399 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects parents' rights to
"establish a home and bring up children").
96. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
97. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530, 536.
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welfare of its citizens by requiring school attendance and
regulating the qualifications of schools and teachers. 98 However,
the Court held that states cannot enact legislation that
arbitrarily substitutes the state's judgment in place of the
parents. 99 The Court aptly notes in Pierce that "[tihe child is not
the mere creature of the State."'00 Thus, states can regulate to
ensure the general welfare of children, but they cannot control
the content of their education without special justification.'0 '
The Court subsequently relied upon the Meyer-Pierce doctrine
of parental rights to decide an array of family privacy cases.1
0 2
98. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 ('hat the State may do much, go very far,
indeed, in order to Improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally, is clear .. "); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. The Pierce court stated that:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their
teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend
some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and
patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is
manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
Id.
99. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
100. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. Significantly, the Meyer Court anticipated this
finding when it described Plato's Ideal Commonwealth where, in order to
produce "ideal citizens," the most capable children are separated from their
inferiors and raised together outside their individual family structure, Meyer,
262 U.S. at 401-02. The Court pointed out that this vision of society is in direct
opposition to the notions on which our country was founded. Id. at 402.
Because the state protects it citizens but does not take direct responsibility for
their upbringing, as in Plato's Ideal Commonwealth, it should not take on this
task Indirectly via legislation that commandeers parental decision-making. See
tI.
101. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
102. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 768 (1982) (citing Meyer
and Pierce to illustrate the "Court's historical recognition that freedom of
personal choice In matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest" and
thus holding that using a "'fair preponderance of the evidence' standard in a
parental rights hearing does not adequately protect this interest); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 620-21 (1979) (citing Pierce and Meyer to establish
that parents have the right and duty to raise their children, but holding that
Georgia's procedures for admitting children into mental health facilities did not
violate a child's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Zablocki
v. Redhal, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978) (noting that Meyer and Pierce established
that a parent's Interest in child-rearing was part of a larger fundamental right of
personal privacy); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978) (citing Meyer
to support the notion that a parent-child relationship is protected by the
Constitution, but holding that a Georgia statute allowing an Illegitimate child to
be adopted without the father's consent did not violate the father's Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651-52, 658 (1972) (citing to Meyer to establish that a father has a
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In addressing state interference with parental decision-making,
the Court has consistently affirmed the sanctity of parents'
liberty interest in directing the upbringing of their children,
emphasizing its "high place in our society." °0 For example, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,10 4 the Court upheld the right of Amish
parents to remove their children from school after eighth grade
to raise them in the Amish value system.105  The Court noted
that "[tihis primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition."06
constitutionally protected interest in retaining custody of his children and thus
holding that by denying the father of an illegitimate child a fitness hearing, the
state violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 170 (1944) (citing Pierce to
establish that there is a "realm of family life which the state cannot enter," but
holding that a Massachusetts child labor law did not impermissibly enter this
realm).
These early substantive due process cases, which establish a
fundamental right in child-rearing, have since become part of a line of
precedent holding that the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a constitutional
right of family privacy. See Meyer, supra note 91, at 531-44. Since deciding
Meyer and Pierce in the 1920s, the Court has found family privacy to include
fundamental rights to marriage, contraception, abortion, and kinship. See id.
103. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14; see also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,
578 (Tenn. 1993) ('The right to rear one's child is... heavily protected by
federal constitutional jurisprudence.").
104. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
105. Id. at 232.
106. Id. The Court relied heavily on Meyer and Pierce in its decision that the
State's action, although motivated by an interest in the child, impermissibly
interfered with a parent's right and duty to raise his or her children. Id. at 232-
33. The Court held that the state's parens patriae power cannot be exercised
over the objections of a child where the child will not be harmed and will not
harm the welfare of society in any way. Id. at 232-34.
In Yoder, the parents' assertion of parental rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment was bolstered by a claim of religious freedom under the First
Amendment. Id. at 233 The combination of rights to parental autonomy and
religious freedom created a burden on the state to show that the legislation was
more than merely rational and competent. Id. at 233-34. In Meyer and Pierce,
parents challenged state legislation because they sought to provide their
children with education that was impermissible under state law. Pierce, 268
U.S. at 511; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402-03. These two cases can be contrasted to
grandparent visitation cases, where the state is seeking to broaden, not limit,
the child's education opportunity. See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632
(Ky. 1992). Grandparent visitation cases are analogous to the Yoder case,
because in Yoder, the State's position was that the child would have more
complete educational experiences in public schools, as opposed to being
educated in the Amish community. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208, n.3. Similarly, the
states support grandparent visitation legislation by arguing that the statutes
are aimed at advancing a children's welfare by securing their opportunity to
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Despite its lip service to parental rights, the Court will not
strike down state legislation merely because it touches upon a
parental decision. 10 7 Some state regulation affecting the family is
necessary because states endeavor to protect the population's
welfare even while relying on the family to nurture their
citizens. ' °s Moreover, the Court has yet to consistently use a
single test to consider state regulation challenged under the Due
Process Clause.'0 9 Often the Court will employ a strict scrutiny
analysis that renders a statute unconstitutional if it infringes
upon a fundamental right unless it is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest."° In reality, however, the Court has
r-ap the benefits of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. See, e.g., King,
S.W.2d at 632.
107. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating
that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest").
108. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the parents
patriae doctrine). In Prince, the Court upheld a labor law forbidding minor
children to sell merchandise in public places against a challenge from a legal
custodian who sought to allow her children to sell religious publications on the
street. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170. In its analysis, the Court reaffirmed that "it is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166. However, the
Court stated that the family was not totally outside the realm of state
legislation, particularly in light of the "crippling effects of child employment"
that the state was seeking to remedy. Id.
The Court has also held that an unsound decision by a parent does not
void that parent's fundamental right of parental autonomy. See Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). In considering the evidentiary burden a
state is required to meet to terminate parental rights, the Supreme Court noted
that "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents." Id. at 753. Although this case addressed complete
termination of parental rights, while considering the grandparent visitation
issues, it raises the question of when state intervention is permissible if it is not
justified merely because the parent is not a model parent. Id.
109. See Meyer, supra note 91, at 534-35.
110. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). In analyzing
the constitutionality of a statute under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, a court must begin by identifying the nature and classification
of the liberty interest that opponents of the statute seek to protect. See Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) ("Substantive due process analysis must begin
with a careful description of the asserted right."). A liberty interest Is deemed
fundamental, and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, if it is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted), To
classify a liberty interest as "fundamental," the Court may examine whether the
right was recognized at common law. Id. at 709-18. The Court may also rely on
precedent to determine if a right should be treated as fundamental. See Reno,
507 U.S. at 303. If the Court identifies the liberty interest as "fundamental,"
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not uniformly relied on this analysis."1 ' For example, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,1 2 the Court failed to
apply "strict scrutiny" to a statute infringing the right to an
abortion, which it previously had declared a fundamental
right." '3 Instead, the Court inquired whether the state statute
"unduly burdened" this right." 1 4
Moreover, in considering a substantive due process claim, the
Court may decline to articulate the analysis upon which it
relied." 5 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, ' 6 in which the court
struck down a housing ordinance defining "family" so as to
prevent two cousins from residing together in their
grandmother's home, the Court avoided applying a specific
test. Instead, the plurality noted that "appropriate limits on
substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines
but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.""'18
Some commentators suggest that the level of scrutiny a court
applies depends on the specific interest invoked by the facts of
each case.119 Due to the different approaches the Court uses in
then legislation infringing on that liberty can only be upheld if "the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Glucksburg, 521 U.S.
at 721 (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 302); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 388 (1978) ("When a statutory classification significantly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only
those interests.").
111. See Meyer, supra note 91, at 556-57.
112. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
113. Id. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
women's ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the
heart of the protected liberty...."); see also generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
114. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-79.
115. See, e.g., infra note 118 and accompanying text.
116. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
117. See id. at 505-06. Relying heavily on the doctrine of Meyer and Pierce,
the plurality found that by preventing a grandmother from establishing a home
with two cousins because they were not brothers, the city's ordinance
impermissibly dictated state policy inside the family realm. Id. The plurality did
not employ a strict scrutiny analysis, but instead cited the holding of Pierce and
found "by the same token the Constitution" prohibits the Ohio statute. Id. at
506.
118. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
119. See Meyer, supra note 91, at 575. Professor Meyer suggests that
whichever level of scrutiny the Court purports to apply, it will ultimately use a
reasonableness standard. Id. at 548. He also points out that the lack of a
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its substantive due process cases, the perimeters of
fundamental rights is often regarded as a "quagmire" of
jurisprudence.120  Accordingly, whenever the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to a substantive due process claim, legal
commentators and practitioners follow the case with great
anticipation. 12
D. Anticipating Troxel: State Supreme Courts Offer Substantive
Due Process Analysis of Grandparent Visitation Statutes
The Troxel case enjoyed a wide audience because the state
supreme courts that had considered the constitutional
limitations on grandparent visitation statutes reached conflicting
conclusions. 2 2  While the Kentucky and Missouri grandparent
visitation statutes survived constitutional challenge, 23 four
states -Tennessee, Georgia, North Dakota, and Washington-
declared that their states' grandparent visitation statutes
unconstitutionally violated substantive due process rights.
24
Kentucky was the first state supreme court to rule explicitly
on the constitutional issues arising from grandparent visitation
statutes.12  In King v. King, the Kentucky Supreme Court
acknowledged that while parents enjoy a constitutional right to
raise their children free from government interference, that right
is not absolute. 26  The court agreed with the Kentucky
consistent standard is troublesome because it fails to give lower courts proper
guidance. Id. at 547.
120. Id. at 531.
121. See Collins, supra note 9, at 9.
122. See infra Part I.D (discussing the holdings of state supreme court cases
addressing the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes).
123. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992); Herndon v. Tuhey,
857 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Mo. 1993).
124. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995); Hoff v.
Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291 (N.D. 1999); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582
(Tenn. 1993); In reTroxel, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998).
125. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 630. The Kentucky grandparent visitation
statute, at issue in King, provided:
REASONABLE VISITATION RIGHTS TO GRANDPARENTS
The Circuit Court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the
paternal or maternal grandparents of a child and issue any necessary
orders to enforce the decree if it determines that it is in the best interest
of the child to do so ....
The action shall be brought in Circuit Court in the county in which the
child resides.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1)(2) (1999).
126. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 631. The court pointed out that state
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legislature that allowing grandparents to petition for visitation
rights was "an appropriate response to the change in the
demographics of domestic relations"'' 27 and that the procedural
requirements of the statute would adequately protect parental
rights. 2 18 Therefore, the statute did not violate the United States
Constitution. 129
The Supreme Court of Missouri considered the
constitutionality of its grandparent visitation statute in Hemdon
v. Tuhey.130 The Hemdon court focused on the extent to which
the statute infringed upon parents' constitutional rights.' 3'
legislation hinders parental autonomy rights by enacting mandatory education,
mandatory inoculation, and child abuse and child labor laws. Id.
127. Id. at 632. In expressing its approval of the policy behind rule 12.9,
section 405.021 of the Kentucky Code, the court asserted:
That grandparents and grandchildren normally have a special bond
cannot be denied. Each benefits from contact with the other. The child
can learn respect, a sense of responsibility and love. The grandparent
can be invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain insight into our
changing society, and can avoid the loneliness, which is so often a part
of an aging parent's life. These considerations by the state do not go
too far in intruding into the fundamental rights of the parents.
Id.
128. Id. The procedures, which the court concluded would adequately protect
parental rights, include filing an action, conducting a hearing before a judge or
commissioner, and recording findings of facts and conclusions demonstrating
that the ruling is in the best interest of the child. Id.
129. Id.
130. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993). The Missouri grandparent visitation
statute, in pertinent part, states:
The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents of
the child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree. The
court may grant grandparent visitation when:
The parents of the child have filed for a dissolution of their marriage. A
grandparent shall have the right to intervene in any dissolution action
solely on the issue of visitation rights. Grandparents shall also have
the right to file a motion to modify the original decree of dissolution to
seek visitation rights when such rights have been denied to them;
One parent of the child is deceased and the surviving parent denies
reasonable visitation rights; or
A grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a
period exceeding ninety days.
The court shall determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be
in the child's best interest or if it would endanger the child's physical
health or impair his emotional development. Visitation may only be
ordered when the court finds such visitation to be in the best interests
of the child. The court may order reasonable conditions or restrictions
on grandparent visitation.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402 (1992).
131. Hemdon, 857 S.W.2d at 208 ("[Tihe magnitude of the infringement by
the state is a significant consideration in determining whether a statute will be
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Because the grandparent visitation would be "temporary" and
"occasional," the court found that the resulting intrusion upon
parental authority was "minimal.' 32 Like the Kentucky court in
King, the Hemdon court approved of the legislature's desire to
foster grandparent-grandchild relationships. 133 Accordingly, the
Hemdon court upheld the Missouri statute. 134
In contrast, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Hawk v.
Hawk,135 ruled that Tennessee's Grandparents' Visitation Act
136
interfered with the fundamental liberty interests in parental
autonomy articulated in Meyer and Pierce.137 The court focused
on the standard used by the trial judge considering the case.1
38
Because the statute did not require the trial judge to make any
initial findings that would justify disregarding a parent's
judgment, the trial judge could usurp parental authority
whenever he or she disagreed with the parents regarding the
bests interests of the child, based solely on the generalized
struck down as unconstitutional.").
132. Id.at209-10.
133. Id. For a critique of the Hemdon decision see Joan C. Bohl, Family
Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation: How Precedent Fell Prey to Sentiment in
Hemdon v. Tuhey, 62 Mo. L. REv. 755, 757 (1997), arguing that Herndon was
wrongly decided because the court based its ruling on generalized notions of
sentiment. But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("As with so many
other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law
accepts as a starting point ... but [the fact that some people act contrary to the
presumption] is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human
experience ...").
134. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210-11.
135. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
136. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-6-301 (1985) (allowing the court to grant
"reasonable visitation" if it serves "the best interests of the minor child"). The
ruling in Hawk has not thwarted the legislature's efforts to allow for
grandparent visitation. See id. § 36-6-301(B) (1996 & Supp. 2000) (authorizing
grandparents' to petition for visitation rights when the state places their
grandchild in a foster home); id. § 36-6-306(4) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (authorizing
grandparents to petition for visitation rights upon the death or divorce of their
grandchild's parents); id. § 36-6-307(b) (1996 & Supp. 2000) (authorizing
grandparents to petition for visitation of a grandchild who has been adopted by
a relative or stepparent if the grandparent had a close relationship with the
grandchild and the grandchild's welfare would be threatened without visitation).
137. See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 578. "(Tlhe right to rear one's children is so
firmly rooted in our culture that the United States Supreme Court has held it to
be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution." Id. (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399). "The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed this right on many occasions." Id. (discussing
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-45).
138. Id. at 577, 582.
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notion that grandparent visitation is beneficial. 139  The
Tennessee court concluded that in order to adequately protect a
parent's constitutional rights, a court should grant visitation
only upon proof of harm or potential harm to the child. 4 °
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Brooks v.
Parkerson,14' reached a similar conclusion regarding its
grandparent visitation statute. 142 The court declared the statute
unconstitutional under both the U.S. and Georgia State
Constitutions. 143 The court determined that the right to raise achild without state interference constituted a fundamental
139. Id. at 577.
140. Id. at 580. Hawk declared that court-ordered visitation despite the
objection of two fit parents, who are married and retain custody of their child,
amounted to a constitutional violation. Id. at 582. The Court justified the
"harm to the child" standard by finding that "[tlhe federal cases that support the
constitutional right to rear one's child and the right to family privacy also
indicate that the state's power to interfere in the parent-child relationship is
subject to a finding of harm to the child." Id. at 580. In reviewing Supreme
Court jurisprudence on this issue, the Hawk court noted that in Yoder, Pierce,
and Meyer, the fact that the child was not subject to harm in receiving an
Amish (Yoder) or private school education (Pierce) or learning a foreign language
(Meyer) was an essential factor in the Court's ruling that the statutes were
unconstitutional. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court held that a state cannot
eliminate parental rights without finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the child was neglected. Id. (discussing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
On the other hand, in Prince, the Supreme Court allowed the state to prohibit
children from selling materials on the street because of the potential harms
associated with child employment. Id. (discussing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
The Tennessee legislature incorporated the "harm to the child" standard
along with a public policy rationale in the text of its visitation statute, providing
that:
[Tihe general assembly finds that it is sound public policy to provide
children with the stability and continuity of meaningful relationships in
their lives. If grandparents have had a sufficient existing relationship
with a child, a loss of that relationship would be a severe emotional and
psychological blow to the child, and such a loss creates a rebutable
presumption of substantial danger to the welfare of the child.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-307 (1996 & Supp. 1999). This statute now reads more
explicitly, providing that "in considering a petition for grandparent visitation the
court shall first determine the presence of a danger of substantial harm to the
child." Id. § 36-6-306 (Supp. 2000).
141. 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
142. Id. at 770; see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Harrison 1988). The Georgia
grandparent visitation statute provides that "the court may grant any
grandparent of the child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special
circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests
of the child." Id.
143. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773.
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liberty that warranted the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 144  The court further agreed with the Tennessee
Supreme Court's holding in Hawk that a "harm to the child"
standard must be used in visitation cases.145
Unlike the Tennessee and Georgia courts, the Supreme Court
of North Dakota, in Hoff v. Berg,146 did not require proof of harm
to the child to justify state action in grandparent visitation
cases.17 Rather, the court first identified parental autonomy as
a fundamental interest and then applied strict scrutiny to the
statute.14  The court held that North Dakota's grandparent
visitation statute was not sufficiently narrow, and thus was
unconstitutional, because the state could not articulate a
compelling interest in the presumption that grandparent
visitation was in the best interests of a child unless the parents
could prove otherwise. 149
144. Id. at 772.
145. Id. The court found that a state can interfere with this right only to
protect the health and welfare of the child and when "parental decisions in the
area would result in harm to the child." Id. Section 19-7-3(c) of the Georgia
Code allows courts to grant grandparent visitation if it "finds the health or
welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if
the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation." GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-3(c).
146. 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999).
147. Id. at 287; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997). The statute
provides in relevant part:
GRANDPARENTAL RIGHTS OF VISITATION TO UNMARRIED MINORS-MEDIATION
OR ARBITRATION. The grandparents of an unmarried minor must be
granted reasonable visitation rights and the great-grandparents may be
granted reasonable visitation rights to the minor by the district court
upon application by the grandparents or great-grandparents unless a
finding is made that visitation is not in the best interests of the minor.
Visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are presumed
to be in the best Interest of the minor. The court shall consider the
amount of personal contact that has occurred between the
grandparents or great-grandparents and the minor and the minor's
parents. This section does not apply to agency adoptions or when the
minor has been adopted by a person other than a stepparent or
grandparent.
Id.
148. Hoff, 595 N.W. 2d at 289-90. Describing the strict scrutiny standard,
the North Dakota court explained that "[where fundamental rights or interests
are involved, a state regulation limiting these fundamental rights can be
justified only by a compelling state interest and legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn."' Id. (quoting Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)).
149. Id. at 291-92. For further comment on Hoff, see generally David T.
Whitehouse, Constitutional Law-Grandparent Visitation Rights: North Dakota
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II. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE: NINE JUSTICES AND SIX OPINIONS
The constitutional questions concerning the validity of
visitation statutes came to the forefront in Troxel v. Granville
when the Supreme Court considered the application of the
statutes to real families. 150 The respondent, Tommie Granville,
and the petitioner's son, Brad Troxel, shared a serious
relationship from January 1989 until June 1991.'51 Although
they were never married, they had two daughters together,
Natalie and Isabelle Rose.15 2 Upon severing their relationship in
1991, Granville retained primary custody while the girls spent
every other weekend with Brad Troxel, often staying at Brad's
parents' home. 53 Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993.154
After his death, Brad's parents, Gary and Jenifer Troxel,
maintained regular contact with the girls, until October 1993
when a dispute arose between Granville and the Troxels
regarding the frequency of the Troxels' request to visit with the
children. Because Granville had married and her new
husband had two children from a prior marriage, she sought to
limit her daughters' visitation with the Troxels to once a month
in an effort to foster the development of her new blended
family. 5 6  Dissatisfied with Granville's proposal, the Troxels
petitioned the Skagit County Superior Court pursuant to
Washington's third party visitation statute seeking court-ordered
visitation with their granddaughters two weekends a month,
Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter, and visitation for two
weeks during the summer.157
Declares the Grandparent Visitation Statute Unconstitutional in Hoff v. Berg,
1999 N.D. 115, 595 N.W.2d 285, 76 N.D. L. REV. 191 (2000).
150. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
151. Id.
152. Respondent's Brief at 8, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-
138).
153. In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Petitioner's Brief
at 2, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-138); Respondent's Brief at 9.
154. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 60.
155. Id. at 60-61.
156. Respondent's Brief at 9.
157. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699; Petitioner's Brief at 4-5. Section 26.10.160(3) of the
Washington Code is classified as a third party visitation statute because "[a]ny person" has
standing to petition the court for visitation of a minor child; the statue on its face is not limited to
grandparents. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1997). However, under the facts of Troxel, the
third party petitioners were grandparents and thus the case was analogous to cases arising under
the more common grandparent visitation statues. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57. The Troxel case was
billed as a "grandparents rights" case by the media and received national attention because its
ruling was anticipated to impact grandparent visitation legislation, unlike third party visitation
20011
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At trial in 1994, Granville testified that she did not want to
completely deny the Troxels visitation with their grandchildren,
but sought only to limit the length and frequency of the visits.'5 8
Specifically, the parties disagreed on whether the girls should
stay overnight in the Troxels' home.15 9 The trial judge granted
the Troxels one overnight visit a month, one week during the
summer, and four hours on each of the Troxel's birthdays.' 60
Granville appealed the trial judge's decision to the Washington
Court of Appeals.' 6' After reviewing the legislative history of
Section 26.10.160(3),162 the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and held that the Troxels did not have standing to petition
for visitation without a separate custody action pending. 163 The
Court of Appeals ruled that this limitation was necessary to
make the statute "consistent with the constitutional restrictions
on state interference with parents' fundamental liberty interest
in the 'care, custody, and management' of their children."
6 4
The Washington Supreme Court subsequently granted the
Troxels' appeal and affirmed the decision of the appellate
court.' 65 The Washington Supreme Court, however, declined to
follow the appellate court's holding. 66  Instead, the supreme
statutes, which have been enacted in all fifty states. See supra note 6 (listing major newspaper
articles discussing Troxel as a grandparent visitation rights case). The media correctly anticipated
that the fact that the case arose from a third party visitation statue as opposed to a grandparent
visitation statute was not significant due to factors the Court considered; the status of the Troxels
as "grandparents" did not impact the outcome. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text
(explaining the three factors that supported the Troxel plurality's holding).
158. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699.
159. Tommy hired a counselor who recommended that the Troxels visit with
Natalie and Isabelle one day a month without an overnight stay. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 698.
162. Id. at 699-701. The court reasoned that because parents enjoy a
constitutionally protected right to be free from state interference in the "care,
custody, and management" of their children, the legislature could not have
intended the statute to have the meaning as read on its face, i.e., that "any
person" could petition the court at "any time." Id. at 700.
163. Id. at 701. The Troxels unsuccessfully argued that a 1992 proceeding
brought under the Uniform Parentage Act resulting in a parenting plan
between Tommie and Brad satisfied the conditions necessary to give them
standing. Id. at 701. The court rejected this argument because the parenting
plan was not in the record, furthermore, it interpreted the statute to require
that visitation be granted as part of the proceedings, not subsequent to them.
See id.
164. Id. at 700.
165. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (1998), cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
166. Id. at 26 ("Our concern with the Court of Appeals analysis is its
reluctance to address the plain language of RCW 26.10.160(3)."). Although the
762 [Vol. 50:717
20011 Protecting Fundamental Parental Rights
court accepted the plain meaning of the statute and held that as
written, Section 26.10.160(3) granted standing to the Troxels.
167
The court went on to hold that the visitation statute was
unconstitutional on its face. 1 8 The court reasoned that allowing
a judge to order visitation over the objections of parents without
an initial finding of potential harm to the child was an
infringement on parents' fundamental rights to rear their
children without state interference. 1
69
In its analysis, the Washington Supreme Court emphasized its
desire to protect the integrity of the family unit, which has been
"zealously guarded by the courts."' 70 To achieve this protection,
the court reviewed the sources of state power 7 ' and reasoned
that the state is not authorized to intrude upon parental
decision-making absent a finding of harm to the child.
172
Therefore, the court found that the visitation statute was
unconstitutional because it did not safeguard parents'
fundamental rights. 
7 3
The Troxels appealed their case and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1999. 74  The Supreme
Court upheld the Washington Supreme Court's ruling six to
supreme court agreed that to allow any person to petition for visitation at any
time had "potentially troubling" consequences, it found that the statute
unambiguously permitted this. Id. at 26-27. Therefore, it struck the statute
down and forced the legislature to redraft it. Id. at 27.
167. See id. at 25 ("'When the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal,
this court is required to assume the Legislature meant exactly what it said and
apply the statute as written."') (quoting Duke v. Boyd, 942 P.2d 351, 354 (Wash.
1997)).
168. Id. at 29.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 28.
171. Id. The court stated that Washington's two sources of authority are
derived from the police power and the parens patriae power. Id. According to
the opinion, the police power authorizes states to "protect citizens from injuries
inflicted by third persons or to protect its citizens from threats to health and
safety." Id.
172. Id. at 30-31. The court further explained that allowing Washington to
issue a visitation order over parental objection without a showing of harm to the
child "would be the logical equivalent to asserting that the state has the
authority to break up stable families and redistribute its infant population to
provide each child with the 'best family."' Id. In addition, the court suggested
that the statute required the petitioner to show he or she had a substantial
relationship with the child. Id. at 31. The court reasoned that in the absence of
a substantial relationship, the child probably won't be harmed by a lack of
visitation. Id.
173. Id.
174. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
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three with no majority opinion.
17
A. The Plurality Focuses on the Application of an Open-ended
Third Party Visitation Statute
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, wrote the plurality opinion, which
held that Section 26.10.160(3) was unconstitutional as applied
by the trial court to Tommie Granville. 17 6  Justice O'Connor
noted that Washington's legislature enacted the third party
visitation statute in response to changes in the composition of
the American family, particularly the increase in single-parent
households. 177  However, despite the legislature's legitimate
motives, laws that allow non-parents to challenge parental
discretion in a judicial proceeding come with the cost of
burdening the parent-child relationship.' 78  Justice O'Connor
revisited the substantive due process precedent that established
the right of parents to be free from state influence in decisions
regarding the care, custody, and control of their children. 79 She
discussed the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing
the Meyer-Pierce doctrine, "'o and reaffirmed that "[i]n light of this
extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children. "' 8'
Although the Washington Supreme Court declared Section
26.10.160(3) unconstitutional pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Meyer-Pierce doctrine, the plurality limited
this holding by finding the statute unconstitutional only as
applied to Granville. 8 2 The plurality stressed that a combination
175. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000).
176. Id. The Court discussed parental rights in relation to all third parties.
Id. at 63-64.
177. Id. at 64 (noting that "while many children may have two married
parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are raised in
single-parent households .... In these single-parent households, persons
outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in
the everyday tasks of child rearing.").
178. Id.
179. Id. at 66.
180. See supra Part I.C (explaining how Meyer and Pierce established a
parent's fundamental right to raise his or her children free from state
interference).
181. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
182. Id. at 74-75.
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of factors contributed to their finding that the trial judge's initial
ruling in Troxel clearly violated Granville's constitutional
rights. i 3 First, the Court stated that "there is a presumption
that fit parents act in the best interests of their children."'84
Therefore, absent evidence to the contrary, the trial judge should
have given preference to Granville's evaluation of the best
interests of her daughters.'85 Second, not only did the trial judge
ignore the presumption in favor of Granville, but also he
erroneously based his decision on the opposite presumption-
that unless proven otherwise, grandparent visitation is in the
best interests of grandchildren. 8 6 Third, Granville did not want
to completely deny the Troxels visitation with their
grandchildren; she sought only to limit the visitation to one
short visit per month and limited holidays. 87 In light of these
factors, the plurality held that, the visitation order issued by the
Washington Superior Court violated Granville's due process
rights.' 8
The plurality did not define the precise scope of the parental
right to make decisions regarding grandparent visitation. 1 9 It
neither adopted nor rejected the standard proposed by the
Washington Supreme Court that there must be a potential for
harm to the children in order to justify judicial intervention.' 90
Instead, the plurality criticized the Washington statute for
enabling a judge to substitute his or her judgment for that of a
fit parent.19' The plurality stated that the trial judge must
"accord at least some special weight" to parents' judgment when
considering whether to grant a third party visitation rights.'
92
However, the plurality declined to incorporate that special
weight into a standard that would consistently guarantee
183. Id. at 68.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 70.
186. Id. at 69.
187. Id. at 71.
188. Id. at 72.
189. Id. at 73.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 67 ("[T]hus, in practical effect, in the State of Washington a court
can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning
visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation
petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best
interests.").
192. Id. at 70.
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sufficient constitutional protection of parents' rights. 1
93
B. Two Concurring Justices Support a Facial Invalidation of
Washington's Third party Visitation Statute
Justice Souter did not join the plurality, but instead wrote a
separate concurrence, stating that he would uphold the
Washington Supreme Court's decision, which declared the
statute unconstitutional on its face. 94 Like the plurality, Justice
Souter declined to evaluate the Washington Supreme Court's
holding; however, he supported the Washington Supreme
Court's finding that by allowing a judge to grant visitation rights
to "any person" who petitioned the court "at any time," based
solely on a best interests standard, the statute was
impermissibly broad. 95  Because the statute completely
disregarded a fundamental right, Justice Souter concluded that
the Washington Supreme Court correctly struck down the
statute as unconstitutional based on its breadth. 
96
Justice Thomas, who wrote a separate concurrence, also
found the Washington Statute facially unconstitutional on its
face. 197  While Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality
regarding the statute's infringement upon a recognized
fundamental right, he criticized the plurality for not applying the
strict scrutiny standard. 98
C. Dissenting Justices Cite Insufficient Findings and Lack of
193. Id. at 68.
194. Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (relying upon Meyer]. Justice Souter
also noted that "parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule" in
the absence of a government interest. Id. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 77-79 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter found it
unnecessary to define precisely which statutory provisions would sufficiently
protect parental rights. Id. at 78-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas argued that the
Washington statute could not survive strict scrutiny because the state of
Washington did not have a compelling interest in "second- guessing a fit
parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties." Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
198. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas implied that the plurality
approached the issue improperly: 'I write separately to note that neither party
has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided ......
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Although Kennedy and Souter found that the
Washington statute touched upon a fundamental right, Justice Thomas
commented that neither applied strict scrutiny as precedent requires. IA.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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Precedent To Sustain a Constitutional Challenge
Justice Stevens wrote the first of three dissenting opinions in
arguing that the trial court did not make sufficient findings of
fact to allow the case to be reviewed.' 99 Justice Stevens believed
that the Court should have corrected the Washington Supreme
Court's flawed reasoning and remanded the case for additional
findings.0 °
The broad language of the Washington statute did not trouble
201Justice Stevens. He suggested that the open standing
provision was justified by the legislature's recognition of third
parties who should be able to obtain a visitation order in light of
their well-established relationship with the child.20 2  Next,
Justice Stevens criticized the Washington Supreme Court's
holding that judicial intervention is not permissible absent a
showing of potential harm to the child, arguing that precedent
does not mandate such a rigid and extreme standard.0 3
Justice Scalia wrote a brief dissent in which he argued that
the right of parents to be free from state intervention in the care,
custody, and control of their children is not as well established
as the other Justices suggest.2 4 By recognizing and affirming
the existence of parental rights "under a Constitution that does
not even mention them," Justice Scalia argued that the Court
has begun to federalize family law.2 5 He would have reversed
the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Troxel on the
grounds that the judiciary lacked the authority to interfere with
206the state legislature's action on this issue.
In the final dissent, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
Washington Supreme Court's holding that a "harm to the child"
standard must be applied in all third party visitation cases. 7
199. Id. at 81-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 84-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I believe that a facial challenge should fail
whenever a statute has a 'plainly legitimate sweep."') (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that "[oinly three holdings of
this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children -two of them from an era rich
in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated") (citations
omitted).
205. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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He argued that Supreme Court precedent did not require such a
208
strict standard. Moreover, Justice Kennedy believed that the
Washington Supreme Court was imprudent in replacing the
universally adopted "best interests of the child" standard with a
new "harm to the child" standard." 9 Justice Kennedy conceded
that awarding visitation privileges to a third party based on a
judge's assessment of the child's best interests may not
adequately protect parents' rights in all cases, and contended
that the Washington Supreme Court went too far in holding that
proof of potential harm to the child is necessary to justify
judicial intervention in all cases.1 ° Justice Kennedy called for a
flexible standard that would allow the family courts to use their
discretion and experience in resolving such difficult cases.2 1'
III. UNCOVERING THE CONSENSUS IN THE TROXEL OPINIONS
A. The First Component: An Open Grant of Standing Raises Little
Concern
The plurality in Troxel did not express concern regarding the
open standing provision in Section 26.10.160(3).212 Rather, the
plurality discussed the policies that motivated the legislatures to
give third parties a statutory right to petition for visitation, and
208. Id. at 96-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that although cases such
as Prince and Yoder have held that states possess authority to intervene to
protect a child from harm, these cases fail to establish that state Intervention is
limited to cases in which a potential for harm exists).
209. Id. at 99-100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the state court
should more appropriately find that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied).
210. Id. at 98, 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested
that parents' fundamental rights stem from their role as custodian by
explaining that "the custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine,
without undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and
educate the child." Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Kennedy points out that in many cases, a non-parent may have been the child's
primary caregiver. Id. at 98-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In these cases, this
"defacto parent" may have an interest in visitation with the child that justifies
interfering with parental rights. Id. at 100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In short,
a fit parent's right vis-A-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-A-vis
another parent or a defacto parent may be another.").
211. Id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy believed that
the "family courts... are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet
inevitable, issues that arise." Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 57, 69 ('The problem here is not that the Washington Superior
Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to
Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests.").
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further validated these policies with government statistics to
illustrate the changes in modem families.21 3 Although the
plurality ultimately found that the statute was
unconstitutionally applied, it did not base this finding on the
fact that the statute granted standing to the Troxels to allow
them to challenge Granville in court.21 4  The plurality, which
described the Washington statute as "breathtakingly broad" still
refrained from adding the statute's open grant of standing to its
list of factors that influenced the decision. 2 5  The Court's
recognition of the policy supporting non-parent visitation
statutes and their lack of criticism of the open standing
provision in the Washington statute suggests that Justices
O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
believe that an open grdnt of standing to grandparents and other
third parties does not constitute a constitutional violation.21 6
Dissenting Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy appear to
accept the proposition that the Washington statute's broad grant
217of standing does not render it unconstitutional. Two
dissenting Justices approved this standing provision.2 8 Justice
Stevens specifically stated that "the Washington statute is not
made facially invalid. .. because it may be invoked by too many
213. Id. at 63-64. The plurality noted that states enacted third party
visitation statutes in response to the increase in single-family homes and the.
resulting increase in grandparents and other parties who play active roles in
raising children. Id. at 64. The plurality also attributes the enactment of
visitation situations to the recognition "that children should have the
opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons-for
example, their grandparents;" a rationale supported by the grandparents' lobby.
Id.; see also Bostock, supra note 11, at 337-41 (discussing visitations statutes
that give rights to grandparents based on their status as grandparents).
214. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72 (explaining that the ruling was based on a
combination of factors relating to the trial judge's application of the visitation
statute); see also Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. App. 2000) ("[Tihe
Supreme Court's holding in Troxel was not decided on the fact that 'any person'
could petition for visitation, rather, was decided on grandparents seeking
visitation rights."); In re G.P.C. 28 S.W.3d 357, 364-65. (Mo. Ct. App. 2000),
application for transfer denied, Oct. 31, 2000 ('The Court (in Troxell noted that
the problem was not the intervention of the Superior Court, but the fact that it
omitted any consideration of the parent's decision regarding the children's
interests.").
215. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 ("Once the visitation petition has been filed in
court and the matter is placed before a judge, a parent's decision that visitation
would not be in the child's best interest is accorded no deference.") (emphasis
added).
216. Id. at 63-64, 69.
217. Id. at 81, 92, 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 90, 98.
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hypothetical plaintiffs."2 9  Justices Stevens and Kennedy
observed that among the wide array of cases that come before a
family court, situations may arise in which it would be
permissible and prudent for a court to grant visitation rights to a
220former caregiver who was not a biological parent.
Regardless of his opinion regarding third party visitation
statutes, Justice Scalia would not strike down an open-ended
visitation statute on constitutional grounds.221 Justice Scalia
stated that the creation of family law falls solely within a state's
power, and, therefore, it is the state's prerogative to authorize
third parties to petition for visitation.222  As a permissible
(though unwise) exercise of state power, Justice Scalia's creation
of standing rights for non-parents to petition for visitation
223presents no federal constitutional issue.
Although concurring Justices Souter and Thomas did not
specifically address the constitutional implications of an open
standing provision, allowing grandparents and other third
parties to petition for visitation, they suggest that they would
219. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 90-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested that
the family courts are best suited to evaluate "the unpredictable, yet inevitable,
issues that arise" from visitation disputes. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Despite his belief that the family courts are well equipped to handle visitation
cases, Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the emotional and monetary
costs of the litigation (as opposed to the substantive claim by the third party)
could interfere with a parent's constitutional rights. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
221. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia posited that the
issue of state power in this context should be argued "in legislative chambers or
in electoral campaigns." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because a parent's right to
direct the upbringing of one's child is a "unenumerated" right not found in the
Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court should not, and cannot, create a new
constitutional right. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not approve of
the Washington statute, but argued that the state legislature is directly
accountable for the wisdom of the statute and that accountability, not the
constitution, will appropriately limit the legislation. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia pointed out that "state legislatures have the great advantages of
doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct their
mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people." Id. at 93 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia remarked that
visitation statutes may Infringe upon the "'unalienable Rights' referred to in the
Declaration of Independence, but "the Declaration of Independence ... is not a
legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts." Id. at 91 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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find that such a grant could render a statute unconstitutional.224
Justice Souter agreed with the Washington Supreme Court that
the statute swept too broadly and, thus, was unconstitutional. 5
That the statute granted standing to "any person" to petition for
visitation "at any time" only contributed to Justice Souter's
opinion that the statute was facially invalid; Souter did not
expressly state that an open-ended grant of standing would
226make the statute unconstitutional. Because Souter failed to
address the standing issue separately from his analysis of the
trial judge's application of the statute, it is difficult to discern on
227which argument Souter based his opinion.
Justice Thomas's strict scrutiny analysis rendered the statute
unconstitutional because the state "lacks even a legitimate
governmental interest-to say nothing of a compelling one" in
228enacting the statute. Because the Washington state
legislature did not have a compelling interest in second-guessing
parental decision making, Justice Thomas did not address the
substance of the statute.229 However, in order to withstand a
strict scrutiny analysis, the standing provision of the statute
would have to fall within "narrowly tallied" means.230
Considering the Washington statute was described as
"breathtakingly broad" by the plurality, it is unlikely that an
open standing provision could be found to be sufficiently
231narrow.
B. The Second Component: Applying the Proper Standard
1. The Requirement of a Presumption in Favor of Parental
Discretion
Despite the absence of a majority opinion in Troxel, the
plurality agreed that there is a legal presumption that parents
act in the best interests of their children.232 This recognition is
224. Id. at 76-77, 80 (Souter, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
226. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) .
227. See id at 75-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
229. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
230. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 67.
232. Compare id. at 68 ("ITIhere is a presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children."), with id. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring)
("[Plarental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in the absence
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important because, as the plurality stated, if parents are
presumed to act in their child's best interest, "there will
normally be no reason for the State to interject itself into the
private realm of the family" and to question parental decision
making.233 This presumption, which is established as a matter
of law, could be a significant obstacle to third party petitioners
seeking court-ordered visitation over the objection of natural
parents.234
According to the plurality and Justice Souter, the application
of a pure "best interests" standard allows a judge to substitute
his own judgment for that of the parents regarding whether third
party visitation serves the child's best interest. 235 However, if the
judge is explicitly bound by legislation to presume the parents'
decision is in the child's best interests, the judge cannot
interfere until the third party petitioner affirmatively satisfies the
burden of rebutting this presumption.236 The plurality indicates
that this legal presumption can prevent the substitute-judgment
of... governmental choice .... ), and id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[Tihe state of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-to
say nothing of a compelling one-in second-guessing a fit parent's decision
regarding visitation with third parties.") and id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[Olur substantive due process case law includes a strong
presumption that a parent will act in the best interest of her child."), and td. at
97-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe law's traditional presumption has been
'that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children."') (quoting Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
233. Id. at 68. Unfortunately, the plurality does not articulate when a
situation is "normal" or when it is sufficiently "abnormal" to justify state
intervention. Id. at 68-69. "Normal" could be narrowly defined as a traditional
intact family and thus any disruption or variation would justify state
interference. See, e.g., In re Herbst, 971 P.2d 395, 396, 399 (Okla. 1998)
(finding that an Oklahoma visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to
two married parents who were living together and objected to grandparents'
visitation). "Normally" could be defined very broadly by finding that it includes
all circumstances in which the child is not subject to harm. E.g., Neal v. Lee,
14 P.3d 547, 550 (Okla. 2000) ("After Troxel, it is unclear whether a showing of
harm is necessary under the United States Constitution. However, this Court's
application of the Oklahoma Constitution [has found that] to reach the issue of
a child's best interests, there must be a requisite showing of harm, or threat of
harm.") (internal quotations omitted).
234. See infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text (describing how a legal
presumption in favor of parents serves to protect their constitutional interests).
235. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 77-78.
236. See, e.g., Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (Ill. 2000) ('The facts of
this case do not warrant the state's interference with the parents' joint decision
regarding who may have visitation privileges with their children. To allow such
interference would unconstitutionally infringe on the parents' [constitutional
rights) .... ").
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problem by forcing the judge to give "special weight" to the
parents' position and ensuring that it is more than a mere
"default rule."
237
The plurality, however, stopped short of holding that state
legislatures must codify this presumption in order for a third
party visitation statute to be valid.238  In fact, the plurality
declined to articulate a standard, which would ensure adequate
protection of parental rights in third party visitation disputes.239
Because they agreed with the plurality that there is a
presumption that parents act in their children's best interests,
Justices Stevens and Kennedy would agree that a third party
visitation statute should require special weight to be given to
parental discretion. 240 However, Justice Stevens suggests that,
depending on state law, the judicial application of the best-
interests standard may already include giving special weight to
241the parents' decisions. Clearly, Justices Stevens and Kennedy
237. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-70. But see In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 364
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that Missouri's grandparent visitation statute
sufficiently protected parents' rights because the denial of visitation must be
unreasonable and have continued for ninety days before the grandparents may
petition the court).
238. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. Even more important to the plurality's finding
that the trial court neglected the presumption in favor of the parents was the
application of the presumption in favor of court-ordered visitation. Id. at 69.
The trial judge had found that it was "commonsensical" that the grandparents
receive visitation and did so in the absence of being shown otherwise. Id. The
plurality is most concerned with this "substitute judgment" result. Id. at 69-70.
239. See id. at 73; In re Aubin, 29 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Tex. App. 2000) (noting
that "[1ln Troxel the Court declined to define the precise scope of the parental
due process right in the visitation context ...."). But see id. at 204 (Walker,
C.J., dissenting) ("Troxel more clearly and more definitively sets forth those
'liberty' interests afforded parents through [the Fourteenth] Amendment."). The
plurality avoided this decision, in part, because it did not address the
constitutionality of the statute on its face, but limited its ruling to the statute as
applied in Troxel. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. Consequently, the court focused more
on the trial judge's decisional framework, as opposed to the language of the
statute. Id. at 69-70.
240. Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that because the parent-
child relationship is a fundamentally protected interest, precedent has
established a rebutable presumption that parents act in the best interest of
their children); Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that application of
the best interest standard may not sufficiently protect the parent-child
relationship if no other limitations are in place).
241. Id. at 84 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the best interest
standard is mandated by ten other Washington state statutes relating to the
protection of minors); see, e.g., Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905-06
(2000) (noting that third party visitation cases utilizing the best interest
standard mandated by New York's visitation statute do not contravene Troxel
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agree with the plurality that the standard applied in third party
visitation cases must provide some protection for the parent-
child relationship by incorporating a legal presumption favoring
parental discretion.242 Their dissent is based on procedural
disagreements, as opposed to doctrinal differences.243
Justices Stevens and Kennedy expressed further doubt as to
whether the Supreme Court would be wise to elaborate one
national standard that would be universally applicable to
244visitation cases. Both Justices observed that the proper
standard must be tailored to the specific facts of each case, and,
thus, they expressed reluctance in advocating any standard
other than the best interests standard because a stricter
standard would prevent trial judges from utilizing their
experience and discretion. 45 On this point, Justice Scalia is
likely to agree, as he argued that the federal courts are ill-
equipped to address the issue of grandparent visitation statutes
because domestic relations law is reserved to and best resolved
246by the states.
because a close analysis reveals that the visitation statute has been interpreted
by the courts "to require substantial deference to the authority of
parents ....").
242. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explicitly stating that
"[b]ecause our substantive due process case law includes a strong presumption
that a parent will act in the best interest of her child, it would be necessary ...
to consider whether the trial court's assessment of the 'best interest of the child'
incorporated that presumption.") (emphasis added); see also i. at 94 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (acknowledging "the distinct possibility that visitation cases may
arise where . . .the best interests of the child standard would give insufficient
protection to the parent's constitutional right to raise the child without undue
intervention by the state").
243. See id. at 81, 101-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens noted that the Court "wisely declines to endorse either the
holding or the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington." Id. at 80
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Because of the Washington Supreme Court's
"sweeping ruling," Kennedy stated that it was not necessary to decide whether
the trial court's visitation order in Troxel violated the right of a fit parent or
whether the Washington statute could be invalidated on its face. Id. at 101-02
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that these type of disputes are
"indisputably the business of the States, rather than a federal court"); see also
id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that state family courts have the
most experience in resolving visitation disputes).
245. Id. at 83, 100-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
246. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting & Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that by establishing that parents' a constitutional right invoked in visitation
cases, the court will be "ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed, and
federally prescribed, family law").
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Finally, Justice Thomas stated that the Washington visitation
statute had no legitimate or compelling interest in "second-
guessing a fit parent's decision."247  This implies that Justice
Thomas would not only accord a presumption in favor of
parents, but would also require a finding that the parents are
unfit before a visitation order could be issued against the
parents' wishes.248
2. The Requirement of Proof of Potential Harm to the Child
Before the Court's ruling in Troxel, three state supreme courts
suggested that the U.S. Constitution mandates third party
visitation statutes to incorporate a legal standard requiring the
court to inquire whether the child will be harmed without the
requested visitation. 249 The Troxel Court, however, declined to
acknowledge definitively whether this standard is mandated by
the constitution.250
The plurality did not discuss the validity of the harm standard;
it only stated that the standard applied under the statutes must
give parental discretion "some special weight," and that normally
251there is no reason for a court to intervene in a family decision.
One can speculate that the plurality would have used stronger
language if it were inclined to hold that parental discretion can
only be outweighed upon a showing of harm to the child 22 The
plurality instead chose to craft its opinion carefully basing its
holding on a combination of factors as opposed to specific
findings regarding the scope of parental rights. This leaves
serious doubt as to whether the Court would ever set forth a
247. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
248. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
249. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998) (en banc); Brooks v.
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 SW.2d 573,
580 (Tenn. 1993).
250. See Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547, 549-50 (Okla. 2000) (explaining that
although Troxel neglected to clarify whether a showing of harm to the child is
required to justify judicial intervention under the U.S. Constitution, the
Oklahoma Constitution requires the harm-to-the-child standard).
251. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
252. Compare id. at 68-72 (describing the three factors regarding the trial
judge's ruling that supported the holding that the statute was
unconstitutionally applied to Granville), with Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773-74
(finding that a showing of harm to the child is required to justify court-ordered
visitation), and Hawk 855 S.W.2d at 580 (finding that Supreme Court precedent
limits states to grant visitation rights to third parties only upon a showing of
harm to the child).
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standard to be used uniformly throughout the states. 25 3
Moreover, the plurality recognized the policy and rationale
254behind the enactment of states' visitation statutes.  Thus, it is
unlikely that the Court would articulate a standard to nullify a
large number of statutes and thwart the states' attempts to
promote a legitimate state policy.255 Finally, the plurality stated
that because the cases arising from visitation statutes are
factually diverse, it "would be hesitant to hold that specific
nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause
as a per se matter. " 256 Therefore, the plurality shared Justice
Kennedy's concern that a "harm to the child" standard would
unduly constrain the trial courts.
257
Even Justice Souter, one of two Justices who would uphold
the Washington Supreme Court's facial invalidation of the
statute, did not address the issue of whether the constitution
requires "harm to the child," basing his decision solely on the
breadth.258 He also did not reveal his position on the validity of
this portion of the Washington Supreme Court's holding.259
Justice Thomas argued that the Washington statute was
unconstitutional on its face, because the statute had no
legitimate interest in second-guessing the wishes of a fit
parent.26 0 Thus, even a threshold showing of harm would not
save a visitation statute from being struck down under strict
scrutiny if the parents were still found to be fit. Justice
Thomas suggested that he would require application of an unfit
253. Cf. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000) (citing to the
Troxel plurality to support its finding that in order for the family court to grant
visitation to a lesbian de facto parent, It must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, such visitation is necessary to prevent harm to the child). But see In
re G.P.C., 285 S.W.3d 357, 365-66. (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) ("Conflating the three
plurality opinions in Troxel does not indicate that the Missouri Supreme Court's
use of rational basis review ... was incorrect.").
254. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64.
255. See id. Despite its expressed support of the policy behind visitation
statutes, the plurality did not indicate whether the state has a "compelling
interest" in granting visitation to a third party. Id.
256. Id. at 73 (footnote omitted).
257. See id. at 95-96, 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
proper analysis will vary based upon the interests presented in each case).
258. Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that the Washington
Supreme Court decision was based on two separate principles: the absence of
the required harm standard and the breadth of the statute, finding the second
ground sufficient to end the inquiry).
259. Id. at 77-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
261. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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parent standard in all visitation cases.
In their opinions, Justices Stevens and Kennedy addressed the
harm standard on its merits and concluded that the Washington
Supreme Court erred by holding that the U.S. Constitution
requires application of the harm standard in all visitation
cases.26 3  Both Justices contended that neither the U.S.
Constitution nor precedent mandates such an untested and
264rigid harm standard. Similarly, Justice Scalia submitted that
whether harm to the child was required was a decision for the
states because the visitation statute did not raise federal
constitutional issues.265
IV. REFOCUSING VISITATION LEGISLATION ON A PRACTICAL APPLICATION
THAT ADVANCES SOUND POLICY
In spite of the fragmented Troxel opinion, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Due Process Clause provides parents with a
liberty interest in the upbringing of their children without state
interference.266 Troxel reaffirmed that parents are presumed to
act in the best interests of their children.267 State courts have
embraced this proposition in subsequent decisions. 8  Even
262. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
263. See id. at 85-86, 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 86, 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 91-92, 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. See id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[There is a beginning point that
commands general, perhaps unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions:
As our case law has developed, the custodial parent has a constitutional right
to determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise,
nurture, and educate the child."); see also Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 531
(Ill. 2000) ("Encompassed within the well-established fundamental right of
parents to raise their children is the right to determine with whom their
children should associate."); In re RFF, 618 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Mich. 2000) ('The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the liberty interest of parents in the custody,
care, control, and upbringing of their children."). But see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the other Troxel opinions for embracing "the
theory of unenumerated parental rights").
267. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also supra Part III.B. 1 (noting that each opinion in Troxel
recognizes the presumption that parents act in their children's best interest).
268. See, e.g., Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695, 702 (Ga. 2000) (quoting
Troxel to establish "a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of
children"); Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 525 (citing Troxel to establish that the court
must presume parents are acting in their children's best interests); Rideout v.
Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 299 (Me. 2000) (quoting Troxes finding that "so long
as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., Is fit) there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family") (citation omitted) (alteration in original); Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132,
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though third party visitation statutes receive support from valid
concerns about children raised in a changing society,
fundamental parental rights cannot be discarded. 9
Prior to Troxel, grandparent visitation statutes received
criticism because their open standing provisions allowed parents
to be hauled into court regardless of the status of the nuclear
family. Commentators have argued that parental autonomy
rights required courts to apply these statutes only in limited
situations, such as when death or divorce had disrupted the
family, circumstances that have traditionally warranted
equitable relief.27' Nonetheless, in considering Washington's
"breathtakingly broad" visitation statute, Troxel ignored these
criticisms and declined to declare the statute facially
unconstitutional because of its open-ended standing
272provision. The Court aligned itself with state legislatures by
concluding that the changing traditions of the American family
warranted the creation of a statutory remedy for third parties
273who have a stake in a child's development. A majority of
Justices in Troxel recognized that the evolution of the American
1135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (noting that because the mother in Troxel
qualified as a fit parent she was "entitled to the presumption that she acted in
the best interests of her children"); In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 364 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (comparing Troxel with G.P.C. because both involved fit parents who
were "entitled to the presumption that as fit parents, they act in the best
interests of their children"); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 973 (R.I. 2000)
(finding that Troxel established "a presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children").
269. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64.
270. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 576 n. 1 (Tenn. 1993); Bohl, supra note
12, at 80 ("Open-ended grandparent visitation statutes... intrude directly
upon a central aspect of family life."); Bostock, supra note 11, at 355-359
(explaining how expanded grandparent visitation rights infringe upon parental
autonomy); Karen Alyssa Nalle, Whose Child Is It Anyway?: The
Unconstitutionality of the Texas Grandparent Visitation Statute, 51 BAYLOR L.
REv. 721, 740-41 (1999) (criticizing Texas's open-ended visitation statute);
Bums, supra note 10, at 81 ('There also remains a serious constitutional
question as to whether grandparents should be allowed to petition the court for
visitation with a grandchild who remains living with his married parents.").
271. Nalle, supra note 270, at 734-40; Unprescendented Intrusion, supra note
12, at 30-31; Bums, supranote 10, at 81.
272. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 73.
273. Id. at 63-64; id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhere may be
circumstances in which a child has a stronger Interest at stake than mere
protection from serious harm caused by the termination of visitation by a
"person" other than a parent."); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(commenting that "the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that arise" in
visitation disputes are best handled by local state courts).
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family will produce situations that would justify court-ordered
visitation absent the traditional standing requirements, which
274are codified in equitable statutes.
Although grandparents in all fifty states benefit from visitation
legislation, they are only one type of third party that acts as
childcare providers and forms significant relationships with the
children they help raise. 27 5  Step-parents, siblings, foster
parents, prospective adoptive parents, and the non-marital
partners of biological parents also assume essential care giving
roles in children's' lives.27 6 Disputes arise and separate the
children from people with whom they have intimate and
important relationships. 7  A state's interest in protecting a
child's relationship with a non-parent caregiver has heightened
because in some instances, there is no stable family to protect
the child. 278 In some situations, the non-parent may become a
"psychological parent"279 to a child and establish equitable
parental status.28 ° In other cases, the third party's role may not
274. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. The plurality, along with
Justices Stevens and Kennedy, note that familial relationships are evolving and
unpredictable. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64, 90, 101.
275. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64 (noting that grandparents and other relatives
assume parent-like roles in many households). But see Rubano v. DiCenzo,
759 A.2d 959, 977, 989 (R.I. 2000) (Bourcier, J., dissenting) ("In Troxel the
Supreme Court referred only to 'relatives' when referring to 'persons outside the
nuclear family. .. .' The High Court does not mention unrelated third parties
when discussing duties of a parental nature.") (citations omitted).
276. Supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (describing cases when third
parties other than grandparents have sought court-ordered visitation with a
child).
277. See supra notes 78-82.
278. See Andersen, supra note 83, at 946-48. Society has an interest in
preserving the family unit because the state relies on the family to raise its
children. Id. at 946. Andersen suggests that three interests emerge in every
non-parent visitation case: that of the parent in parental autonomy; the interest
of the petitioning adult; and the social interest in fostering the family, which
includes protecting the family and the child. Id. at 953-54.
279. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000) (defining a psychological
or defacto parent). The New Jersey Supreme Court has used a four-part test to
determine whether a person should be legally recognized as a psychological
parent: "[(1)] the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship
between the third party and the child; [(2)] the third party must have lived with
the child; [(3)] the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a
significant degree; and most important, [(4)] a parent-child bond must be
forged." Id.
280. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1005 (1999) (confirming that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant a
birth mother's former same-sex partner defacto parent status); V.C., 748 A.2d
at 555 (finding a biological mother's same sex partner who had participated in
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be equivalent to the role of a parent, but the connection between
the child and the third party is significant enough for the state
to intervene and to foster the relationship.281
Given the multitude of parties who may be involved in these
disputes, it is unrealistic for the text of a statute to enumerate
each circumstance that could warrant court intervention
regarding a child's welfare.282  Instead, an open standing
provision grants courts flexibility to provide a remedy to a non-
parent petitioner whose relationship with the child the
legislature could not anticipate.283
In light of Troxel, it appears evident that eliminating open-
ended standing provisions will not cure the constitutional flaws
of visitation statutes, as the respondent-mother in Troxel could
have been sued for visitation under a narrow equity-based
visitation statute and suffered the same unconstitutional
2814infringement. Instead of limiting the class of people who are
the child's upbringing to be a "psychological parent" and able to petition for
custody and visitation); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 965 (R.I. 2000)
(holding that a former same-sex partner of biological mother had standing to
petition the court to establish de facto parental status and to seek visitation
rights).
281. See, e.g., Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 301 (finding that the state
had a compelling interest in considering a petition for visitation rights from
grandparents who have a sufficient existing relationship with their grandchild);
Noonan v. Noonan, 547 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1989) (allowing a sibling to petition for
visitation).
282. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 434-35 (Wisc. 1995) (holding that a
biological mother's former partner, the child's defacto parent, could not petition
for visitation under the state's third party visitation statute because it limited
standing to a dissolution of a marriage, but permitting such visitation under
equitable common law principals): see also Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition,
and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L.
REv. 523, 526 (2000) (suggesting how family law must respond to new family
structures created with biological advancements); Kyle C. Velte, Egging on
Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 431, 435 (1999) (discussing the legal
implications of children born through tri-gametic in vitro fertilization).
283. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 771 (1982) (noting that in the
area of domestic relations law "leaving the States free to experiment with
various remedies has produced novel approaches and promising progress");
Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974 ("[Under certain circumstances, even the existence of
a developed biological, parent child-relationship ... will not prevent others from
acquiring parental rights vis-a-vis the child.,").
284. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (noting that the problem in Troxel was not
that the grandparents had standing to petition the Washington Superior Court,
but that the trial judge applied an inappropriate standard). The petitioning
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granted standing, third party visitation statutes should include
an explicit presumption that favors parents, which would
adequately protect parental autonomy rights.8 5  The Troxel
Court supports this approach as long as the trial court applies
the presumption correctly.8 6 Despite the fragmented opinion,
each Justice explicitly reaffirmed that parents possess a
fundamental liberty interest in the upbringing of their
children.287
The legislature, by explicitly recognizing the legal presumption
in favor of parents in visitation statutes, can reduce the
possibility that a trial court will violate parental rights by
grandparents in Troxel could have petitioned under and equitable or open-
ended statute because their son, the children's father, had died. Id. at 60.
285. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103(d) (West 1999) (providing for a "rebutable
presumption affecting the burden of proof that the visitation of a grandparent is
not in the best interest of a minor child if the child's parents agree that the
grandparent should not be granted visitation rights"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
1802(2) (1998) (providing for "[rleasonable rights of visitation... [upon] clear
and convincing evidence that there is, or has been, a significant beneficial
relationship between the grandparent and... child, that it [serves] the best
interests of the child that such relationship continue, and that.., visitation
will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship"); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
15-5-24.3(a)(2)(r) (1996) (allowing visitation to be granted when petitioner "by
clear and convincing evidence, has successfully rebutted the presumption that
the parent's decision to refuse the grandparent visitation with the grandchild
was reasonable"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2) (1998) (establishing "a
presumption that a parent's decision with regard to grandparent visitation is
reasonable"); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-7(c) (Michie 1999) (providing for a
presumption that when a grandparent files for visitation, "privileges need not be
extended to grandparent[s] -if the parent through whom the grandparent is
related to the grandchild has custody ..., shares custody. . ., or exercises
visitation privileges... that would allow participation in the visitation by the
grandparent if they ... chose").
286. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70; see also Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Servs. v.
Paillet, 16 P.3d 962, 966 (Kan. 2001) (identifying the core issue in Troxel as
whether in the court's decision "the parent's fundamental right to direct her
child's upbringing (is) reflected in a presumption that she acts in the child's
best interest").
287. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (indicating the general
agreement that "the custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine,
without undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and
educate the child."). But see id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
parental rights are found in the Declaration of Independence, but are not
protected by the U.S. Constitution). This liberty interest implicitly presumes
that fit parents make decisions in the best interests of their children. See Lulay
v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 531 (Ill. 2000) ("Ihe decisionmaking function of
parents with respect to the relationships that their children will have ... lies at
the core of parents' liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children.").
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substituting its will for that of the parents.288 Moreover, a legal
presumption in favor of parental discretion will minimize the
dangers associated with an open-ended statutory grant of
standing.289 First, because the evidentiary burden clearly rests
with the petitioner, parties will be reluctant to file claims without
strong evidence of circumstances that justify intervention. °
Second, if claims are filed that amount to nothing more than an
internal family dispute, the petition may be disposed with a
summary judgment motion because a conflict stemming from a
difference in opinion is insufficient to rebut the presumption in
favor of the parents.2 9 ' The petitioner cannot force the parents
288. See, e.g., In re Tamara R., 764 A.2d 844, 852-53 (Md. App. 2000)
(finding that the best way to meet the requirements of Troxel "is to apply a
presumption that the parent's decision to decline visitation is in the best
interest of the child over whom the parent has custody"); cf. ALA. CODE § 30-3-
4. 1(e) (1998) ('There shall be a rebuttal presumption in favor of visitation by any
grandparent."); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(7) (Michie 1999) (providing for
"[rleasonable visitation rights [to] be awarded to parents, grandparents, and any
person interested in the welfare of the child in the discretion of the court,
unless it is shown that rights of visitation are detrimental to the best interests
of the child."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997) (providing that "visitation
rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are presumed to be in the best
interest of the minor"); Hoff v, Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291 (N.D. 1999)
(invalidating the North Dakota statute).
289. See, e.g., In re Richardson, No. HK 1364-A, 2000 WL 869450, at *4 (Va.
Cir. Ct.) (holding that even though former foster parents were "persons with a
legitimate interest" under Virginia's third party visitation statute and thus had
standing to petition the court, no sufficient evidence existed to warrant
infringing upon a fit parent's fundamental rights by requiring third party
visitation).
290. See, e.g., Smolen v. Sinolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 908 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2000)
(holding that unless grandparent-petitioners could clearly show that the
mother's decision to deny visitation was not based on the child's best interests,
the mother's discretion "must be afforded substantial weight as required by
Troxel and cannot be not second guessed").
291. See Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Ky. 1989). The Hicks court
stated that:
A trial of this nature [i.e., a hearing on grandparent visitation] is
extensive and burdensome .... ; [TIhere is sound policy in limiting the
circumstances in which grandparents can seek a hearing on the merits
to consider visitation. The limits to the use of courts as an arena to
settle domestic strife are set by statute, and it is wise policy that these
limitations should be respected.
Id. But see King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992). The King court
stated that:
There is no reason that a petty dispute between a father and son
should be allowed to deprive a grandparent and grandchild of the
unique relationship that ordinarily exists between those individuals.
One of the main purposes of the statute is to prevent a family quarrel of
little significance to disrupt a relationship that should be encouraged
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to endure a full hearing without producing evidence that the
circumstances are severe enough to warrant examining the
parents' discretion.292 Finally, if a trial court inappropriately
substitutes its judgment for that of the parents, a legal
presumption in favor of the parents will ensure that this




Family courts regularly face disputes involving children that
cannot be harmonized with existing precedent and that the
legislature cannot anticipate. As state legislatures and courts
have begun to recognize, in many cases, third party petitioners
present well-founded claims when seeking court intervention.
Visitation statutes should grant standing broadly in order to
provide a legal remedy to petitioners in unforeseen cases. On
the other hand, the law must simultaneously protect the well-
recognized and important right of parental autonomy. A
statutory presumption in favor of parents will best serve the




292. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (noting that courts must base visitation
orders on special circumstances).
293. See, e.g., Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (111. 2000) (finding that
because parents presumably act in the best interests of their children, the state
cannot mandate visitation with grandparents).
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